Missing the (Tipping) Point: The Role of Climate Tipping Points on Public Risk Perceptions in Norway.

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Abstract. Climate tipping points are a topic of growing interest in climate research as well as a frequent communication tool in the media to warn of dangerous climate change. Despite indications that several climate tipping points may be triggered within the Paris Agreement temperature range of 1.5°C to well below 2°C warming above pre-industrial levels, there is limited understanding of the level of public understanding of climate tipping points, the effects this knowledge may have on perceptions of risk related to climate change, and the corresponding behavioural and policy support implications. The emerging scholarship on learning, communication, and risk perceptions related to climate tipping points provides confounding evidence regarding the psychological and behavioural effects of information about climate tipping points. It remains unknown whether and under what conditions this knowledge increases concern, urgency perceptions and action intentions, or whether it might overwhelm audiences, inducing fatalism and withdrawal from public engagement. In this study, we assess the current state of knowledge about climate tipping points among Norwegians using a nationally representative survey. We study the comparative effects of communicating about climate tipping points and climate change more generally on risk perceptions among participants with a survey-embedded experiment. We find low levels of knowledge regarding climate tipping points (<20%). Information about tipping points had somewhat stronger effects on participants’ risk perceptions compared to general information about climate change, moderately increasing concern. We discuss our findings, and the implications, and suggest directions for further research.

1.0 Introduction

Efforts to mitigate the most severe impacts of climate change require urgent attention from both policymakers and the general public (IPCC 2022). Despite recent progress, such as a recent acceleration of renewable energy market growth (IEA 2022), global action continues to be insufficient to reach internationally agreed-upon targets. While uncertainty in future warming projections have narrowed, making pathways towards more than 3°C warming less likely, pathways towards 1.5°C - 2°C futures do not appear credible without rapid, large-scale transformations of human systems (Kuramochi et al., 2022). Among the many reasons for his inadequate response to the climate challenge (Stoddard 2021), public risk perceptions and the corresponding support for climate action have been paramount. When Lenten et al. published their seminal paper introducing the concept of climate tipping elements in 2008, they argued that the persistent lack of climate urgency, i.e., insufficiently
high-risk perceptions, stems from a “false sense of security” (p. 1792) founded in smooth, gradual projections of climate change. This mental model of gradual climate change is now increasingly challenged by a growing body of scientific evidence tipping points in the climate system.

Climate tipping points refer to dynamics in the Earth system, where large system components reach thresholds, resulting in non-linear changes that are irreversible on human timescales (Lenton et al., 2008; Steffen et al., 2018, Armstrong McKay et al., 2022). There is some evidence that multiple climate tipping points may be triggered within the temperature target range set by The Paris Agreement: 1.5°C to well below 2°C (Armstrong McKay et al., 2022; Schellnhuber et al., 2016; Wunderling et al., 2023). With recent projections indicating that global average temperatures could exceed 1.5°C in the 2030s (IPCC, 2021), perhaps even reach 1.5°C temporarily by 2027 (WMO, 2023), climate tipping points add new arguments for the urgency of more ambitious climate action and urgency. This growing relevance has been reflected in more frequent appearances of climate tipping points in the assessment reports of the IPCC and in growing media coverage warning of dangerous climate change (Van der Hel et al., 2018).

However, it is yet unclear to what extent and how climate tipping points are understood by relevant audiences, how knowledge of tipping points affects climate risk perceptions, and whether and how this will influence behaviour change or climate policymaking. The growing importance of climate tipping as a topic for climate change communication and action is not yet reflected in research investigating public understanding, risk perceptions, and action orientations related to climate tipping points. Given the relative novelty of the concept of climate tipping points compared with the science of anthropogenic climate change, the level of public as well as policy maker knowledge is likely to differ between the two. There might also be significant learning challenges associated with tipping points (Renn 2022), linked to the more general challenges of understanding complex systems. This context of uneven knowledge distribution and obstacles to learning has important implications for public risk perceptions and corresponding questions of behaviour change or political engagement. In contrast with now common studies of climate risk perceptions, existing knowledge and understanding of climate tipping points cannot be assumed.

Starting with the assumption that public knowledge of climate tipping points is likely less developed than more general knowledge of climate change, we investigate the current state of public understanding of this concept in Norway. Further, we study the effects of information about climate tipping points on climate risk perceptions compared with the effects of conventional climate change communication. Norway could be affected by a large number of climate tipping points, including the loss of ice in the Arctic and Greenland, permafrost thaw, boreal forest dieback, and changes in ocean circulation patterns. The country is also a major producer of fossil fuels and plays an important role in international climate change negotiations.

The following section (2) briefly reviews the literature on climate risk perceptions, discussing whether and how climate tipping points present novel and specific challenges for this scholarship. Section 3 outlines our methodological approach, followed by a presentation of our results (4), discussion (5) and conclusion.
2.0 Climate Tipping Points: A Challenge for Climate Risk Perception Research

We briefly review the vast scholarship on climate risk perceptions, focusing on the role of knowledge and highlighting insights most pertinent to tipping points (2.1). In section 2.2, we discuss why climate tipping points might affect public risk perceptions differently than information about climate change more generally. This is followed by a deep dive into the still limited literature on risk perceptions relating specifically to climate tipping points, where we identify hypotheses and existing, inconclusive evidence for the effects of climate tipping points on public concern about climate change (2.3).

2.1 Climate Change Risk Perceptions

Climate change risk perceptions refer to individuals' subjective understandings, beliefs, and evaluations of the potential risks and impacts associated with climate change. It encompasses how people perceive the likelihood, severity, and personal relevance of climate change-related impacts. Perceptions of risk are subjective and influenced by several factors, such as personal experience, value orientation, emotion, social norms, and knowledge (Van der Linden, 2015). It is important to consider the complex reality of the risk perception spectrum (Capstick & Pidgeon 2014; Kahan et al., 2012) and consider how the multiple factors interact.

Climate change presents a range of risk perception challenges, especially because it operates on long time horizons, and is perceived as a slow, incremental, and controllable phenomenon with its main impacts occurring in the distant future (Foz-Glassman, 2015; Sterman, 2011; Weber, 2006). Given these common assessments, climate change is associated with a lower sense of urgency and overall lower risk perceptions (Sterman, 2011; van Beek et al., 2022; Weber, 2006) than an abrupt and more tangible phenomenon such as the Covid-19 pandemic (Manzanedo & Manning, 2020).

Knowledge plays a crucial role in climate change risk perceptions. Van der Linden (2015) categorises knowledge as a cognitive factor, which he differentiates from experiential factors, socio-cultural influences and demographics. Scientific knowledge forms the foundation for understanding climate change, and for identifying and evaluating related risks. Risk perceptions are not possible without knowledge of the risk source. This implies that incomplete knowledge or misconceptions matter for the way risks are perceived (Majid et al. 2020). Some studies have demonstrated that instruction, information and knowledge about climate change increase climate risk perceptions (Milfont, 2012; Van der Linden, 2015; Aksit et al. 2018; Xie et al., 2019), while others caution that there is little evidence that knowledge is a strong indicator of pro-environmental behaviour (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002) and that the relationship between knowledge and risk perceptions of climate change are more complicated.

Importantly, knowledge interacts with other variables that shape risk perceptions, especially with political belief and value systems. Adherents to different political ideologies or cultural worldviews experience risks related to climate change very differently (Kahan 2012) driven by dynamics of motivated reasoning to protect a person’s identity and core values. Individuals with a high degree of knowledge of climate change can be found across the entire range of risk perception, from the alarmed to the dismissive (Capstick & Pidgeon, 2014; Kahan et al., 2012). Norgaard (2006, 2011) argues that it is not a lack of
information that reduces risk perceptions of climate change, but a psychological need to keep threatening information at a distance. This observation informs her theory on socially organised denial, in which individuals distance themselves from negative information (about climate change) in order to maintain cultural norms and a positive individual and national identity.

2.2 Climate Change Risk Perceptions

Climate change risk perceptions refer to individuals' subjective understandings, beliefs, and evaluations of the potential risks and impacts associated with climate change. It encompasses how people perceive the likelihood, severity, and personal relevance of climate change-related impacts. Perceptions of risk are subjective and influenced by several factors, such as personal experience, value orientation, emotion, social norms, and knowledge (Van der Linden, 2015). It is important to consider the complex reality of the risk perception spectrum (Capstick & Pidgeon 2014; Kahan et al., 2012) and consider how the multiple factors interact.

In sum, knowledge is a key factor in climate risk perceptions, but interacts with several other variables in ways that are hard to predict.

2.2 Risk-relevant Characteristics of Climate Tipping Points

While the modern science on anthropogenic climate change is over half a century old, the term climate tipping points began to emerge less than two decades ago, referring to ice sheet dynamics in the Arctic (Holland et al., 2006, Lindsay & Zhang, 2005, Winton, 2006). Since then, the use of the term tipping point and corresponding body of knowledge in the climate sciences has been growing rapidly (Milkoreit et al., 2018). The term tipping point generally refers to the moment at which a system reaches this critical threshold at which a small perturbation can qualitatively change the development of the system (Kuehn, 2011; Lenton et al., 2008; Scheffer et al., 2009). Climate tipping points more specifically refer to rapid reorganisations (state changes) of large components of the Earth system that are driven by self-reinforcing feedback mechanisms and can be irreversible on human timescales (Lenton, 2011; Levermann et al., 2012). Over time, more tipping elements in the Earth system have been identified, growing from 8 (Lenton et al., 2008) to 16 in a recent assessment (Armstrong McKay et al., 2022).

Different definitions of climate tipping points exist, and often identify a common set of characteristics of climate tipping processes (Milkoreit 2018, 2022): multiple stable states, abruptness (non-linearity), self-amplifying (positive) feedback mechanisms, and limited reversibility (or hysteresis). Some of these characteristics, especially as non-linearity and irreversibility, present significant aberrations from common conceptions of climate change. In addition to these four features, tipping points share a number of characteristics with climate change more generally that present specific risk perception challenges, including high levels of uncertainty, complexity, long timescales, uneven distribution of impacts in time and space, and the potential for severe (catastrophic) impacts. However, in the case of tipping points, these challenges might be amplified.

Reorganisation/state shift: A core characteristic of a tipping process is the shift of an entire system from one stable state to another, such as the potential transformation of the Amazon rainforest into a grassland. State shifts imply a reorganisation of the system in question, changing its main characteristics, relationships between key entities, and functions. From a human
perspective, the quality of this type of change process is fundamentally different compared to increases in temperature, sea-level rise or even extreme events. State shifts permanently remove the current environmental conditions for human life and social organisation, likely forcing large-scale social reorganisations as well. This is why the impacts of climate tipping processes are expected to be severe, even catastrophic.

The potential impacts of climate tipping points are underexplored in the scientific literature. There is general agreement that triggering climate tipping points will magnify well-established risks and impacts of climate change (OECD, 2022), meeting the description of “dangerous climate change” (McKay et al., 2022). These risks include faster sea level rise, increased intensity of extreme weather events, and abrupt ecosystem shifts (Lenton et al. 2009; OECD, 2022; Wang et al., 2023). Climate tipping points could significantly affect human welfare, threatening global food and water security, negatively impacting human health due to increased risk of disease spread, and destabilising societies (OECD, 2022). Further, each tipping element has a certain potential to contribute to a tipping point cascade, leading to a destabilisation of multiple systems and ultimately having global reach (Lenton et al., 2019; Kriegler et al., 2009; Wunderling et al., 2021). The limited literature on the impacts of climate tipping points clearly points to the amplification of negative climate change impacts, leading to a more distressing image of the future. The corresponding messages of irreversible doom and gloom could have negative, disempowering effects on the public, which are not yet well understood.

Non-linearity (i.e., acceleration of change driven by positive feedback) is a feature of complex systems. Typically, humans tend to comprehend time and cause-and-effect relationships in a linear manner (Dessai & Van der Sluijs, 2007) and struggle to understand non-linear, and exponential changes (Pereira & Viola, 2018). While the climate system is complex, this linear model of causality has ‘worked’, given the well-established linear relationship between the amount of greenhouse gases in the Earth’s atmosphere and average global temperatures. The more GHGs in the atmosphere, the more warming will take place. This fundamental scientific understanding of climate change is evident in IPCC scenarios which portray predominantly linear trends in temperature, sea level, and other variables (IPCC, 2022), and is the foundation for current approaches to climate action. However, the linear model of causation is not able to accommodate tipping dynamics due to the non-linear nature of the change process. Hence, complex system dynamics including non-linearity present distinct learning challenges (Plate 2010; Milkoreit 2015, Renn 2022). Related to the challenges of learning about tipping risks is the observation that systemic risk perceptions are subject to attenuation and underestimation (Schweizer, Goble, Renn 2022). As Schweizer et al. note (2022, p. 1458) “they [systemic risks] are less easily understood and, due to their complexity and nonlinearity, less present in the mental representation of most people”.

Irreversibility as a tipping point feature might not present learning challenges but could have significant and undesirable psychological and emotional effects, including the weakening of agency beliefs, the creation of feelings of powerlessness, anxiety, fear, or dread (Milkoreit, 2015), leading to disengagement and avoidance (Norgaard 2006, 2011).

Like climate change more generally (Marx et al. 2007, Enserink et al. 2013), knowledge about climate tipping points is subject to different types of uncertainty. Key uncertainties pertain to when (under what specific conditions) different tipping points will be reached (Sterman, 2011), how long various state shift processes will take, and what kinds of impacts they will have in
which places - affecting which communities in what ways - over time. Recent assessments conclude that some climate tipping points can be triggered already at +1–2 °C of warming, placing the risk of reaching them within the targets set by the Paris Agreement. Global average temperatures could exceed the targets set by the Paris Agreement as soon as the 2030s (IPCC, 2021), placing the likelihood of triggering climate tipping points “dangerously close” (Lenton et al., 2019, p.529). These temporally closest tipping elements include low-lateral coral reefs, the Greenland Ice Sheet (GrIS), and the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS) (Armstrong McKay et al., 2022).

While tipping processes (transition and effects) are abrupt, they occur over long timescales from a human perspective. These timescales differ for each tipping element and the transition from one state to another can last from days on local scale (e.g. shift in turbid and clear-water phase in lakes) to years (coral reefs) to decades (Amazon rainforest) to millennia (ice sheets), while the effects may last substantially longer. Some of these timescales are short enough that human societies would struggle to adapt to the induced environmental pressures (Alley et al., 2003; Brovkin et al., 2021). However, all of them are long enough that they invite psychological dynamics like distancing (Spence 2012) as well as discounting (devaluing) of future impacts (Dasgupta 2008).

2.3 Perceptions of Climate Tipping Point Risk

The literature on risk perception and communication specifically related to climate tipping points is far more limited than the voluminous body of work on climate change more broadly. Initially, scholars expected climate tipping points to have significant effects on risk perceptions among the public and policy makers, likely increasing concern and urgency. For example, Russil and Nyssa (2009) suggested that communication related to climate tipping points could encourage audiences to include non-linearity in their mental models of climate change (i.e., the potential for rapid changes), and as a result reevaluate their risk perceptions. Nuttall (2012) argued that the looming threat of climate tipping points creates anticipation for the future, and that this heightened attention to long-term change can aid in guiding human action. Regardless of the psychological mechanism - worries about abrupt changes or lengthened time horizons - the hypothesis that climate tipping points would increase risk perceptions created hope that they might counter mitigation inertia (Gardiner 2009) and boost climate action.

An early study by Lowe et al. (2006) provided some evidence for this hypothesis, finding that participants were more concerned about and willing to act on climate change after watching the film “The Day After Tomorrow”, which depicted a fictional rapid cooling scenario due to changes in the Atlantic ocean current. More recently, van Beek et al. (2022) investigated changes in risk perceptions related specifically to climate tipping points using a serious game. They also observed an increase in concern and perceived seriousness of climate tipping points, even among an audience with extensive climate change knowledge and a high baseline of concern - scientists and representatives of NGOs involved in climate change negotiations.

However, it is also possible that information about climate tipping points would elevate negative emotions, especially fear and helplessness, fostering fatalism and public disengagement from climate change. Arguing along these lines, O’Neill et al. (2010) suggested that information about climate tipping points frames climate change as a catastrophic event, leading to feelings of
anxiety, helplessness, and fatalism. Bellamy and Hulme (2011) provided some evidence for this argument. Using a cultural theory of risk framework, they found that climate tipping points increased concern only among participants with an egalitarian value set while also generating a fatalistic narrative among study participants. More recently, in a representative study of the UK, Bellamy (2023) confirmed that risk perceptions differed between social groups depending on their cultural worldview, and also showed that the British public was significantly more doubtful about the prospects of an effective policy response to climate tipping points than to climate change generally.

A third hypothesis is emerging from the recent empirical work: information about climate tipping points might have no meaningful effects on public climate risk perceptions at all. The work by Bellamy and Hulme already indicated that increases in concern were limited to a distinct social group sharing a particular worldview. And a study by Formanski et al. (2022) found no difference between climate risk perceptions related to linear versus non-linear climate change.

Each of these three hypotheses - increased concern, fatalism and no effects - would have different implications for public communication related to climate tipping points. Given the limited and mixed evidence for risk perception effects so far, science communication and media reporting on climate tipping points lacks guidance.

Here, we seek to advance empirical understanding of this phenomenon, pursuing in particular questions about the role of knowledge as a foundation for climate risk perceptions. A number of prior studies have indicated limited public and policy maker awareness of the concept of climate tipping points. For example, Milkoreit (2019) reported limited knowledge among climate negotiators in 2018, and Bellamy’s survey of the UK public (2023) showed that more than a quarter of respondents were unfamiliar with climate tipping points in 2022 despite increased media coverage of the topic. At the same time, systemic risk scholars have argued that tipping points present specific learning challenges and tend to receive less public attention than they merit (Schweizer et al. 2022, Renn 2022). Hence, understanding the state of public knowledge, limitations in understanding, and misconceptions is important to support future communication efforts related to climate tipping points.

2.4 The Norwegian Context

The focus of this study is on climate change risk perceptions in Norway, a small, oil-rich nation that perceives itself as a genuinely concerned nation about climate change (Painter, 2013; Eckersley 2016). Norway’s state-owned company Equinor is engaged in oil and gas extraction primarily for export purposes (Griffin & Heede, 2017), making Norway a significant contributor to anthropogenic GHG emissions. The Global Footprint Network (2023) reported that Norway also had one of the highest carbon footprints per capita in Europe. Contrastingly, Norway is often cited as an example of reaching a consumer tipping point in the purchase of electric vehicles, pointing to the country as a leader in decarbonising their transport system (IEA, 2019; Sharpe & Lenton, 2021).

Recent polling data suggest that Norway is home to a significant amount of climate scepticism, with 24% of Norwegians not believing in anthropogenic climate change (Krange et al., 2019; YouGov, 2019). At the same time, Norway is facing visible signs of climate change, with increased rainfall and frequency of landslides along the West Coast (Hanssen-Bauer et al., 2015). However, research conducted by Gallup (2020) found that only a third of the population in Norway noticed the ongoing
consequences of climate change around them, which affected their risk perceptions. Along with current and future effects of climate change, Norway is likely to be physically affected by a number of identified climate tipping elements, such as thawing of mountain glaciers and permafrost, shifting boreal forests, melting ice sheets, and ocean circulation destabilisation. Rapidly declining glaciers is likely not perceived as a real risk, and the same holds for the vanishing permafrost in the northern county (Finnmark) or on the island of Svalbard, since it does not really put critical infrastructure at risk.

Public knowledge of climate tipping points would have to be based on the consumption of media reporting. As Bellamy shows (2023), media coverage of climate tipping points has significantly increased in international English language reporting over the last twenty years, especially since 2018. To understand whether and to what extent Norwegian newspapers have been covering the topic of climate tipping points relative to general climate change, we conducted a quantitative analysis of Norwegian media using the database available through the National Library of Norway. Our search covers the time period from 2005 to 2022 and over 100 Norwegian press newspapers (local and national) for articles containing the following terms in Norwegian: global warming, climate change, and climate crisis, tipping point, and climate+tipping point (“global oppvarming”, “klima endring”, “klima krise”, “vippepunkt”, “klima+vippepunkt”). As expected, we found substantially more media content on climate-related terms without mentions of tipping points. The first article mentioning climate tipping points was published in April 2006 in the newspaper Klassekampen and focused on irreversible climate changes. It was entitled “Is it too late to turn back?”. Coverage of the subject remained limited (less than 50 articles per year) until 2017, and has been expanding since 2018, mirroring Bellamy’s analysis of British and international news media.

![Graph showing the number of press publications mentioning global warming, climate change, climate crisis, tipping point, and climate+tipping point over time from 2005 to 2022.](https://doi.org/10.5194/esd-2023-23)
Figure 1: Norwegian mentions in press newspaper articles of climate change and climate tipping points.

Mentions of climate tipping points likely became more common after the publication of the Norwegian popular science book “The World on a Tipping Point” (Verden på vippepunktet) by Hessen (2020), and which received wide public attention. Based on these findings we expect knowledge of climate tipping points in the general population to be lower than general climate change.

3.0 Research Design and Methods

3.1 Survey Design

Our study sought to answer the following research questions:

1. What is the level of knowledge of climate tipping points among Norwegians?
2. To what extent does the information on climate tipping points increase concern about climate change?

To answer both questions, we conducted a web-based survey, which was implemented by a third-party polling service in Norway. The survey consisted of three parts. In part 1a, all participants were asked a series of questions about their climate change risk perceptions. Part 1b contained a question about participants’ level of familiarity with the concept of climate tipping points (“vippepunkte”) on a scale of “never heard of it” to “know it well”. If the participant indicated at least some familiarity with climate tipping points (“know it [climate tipping points] well”, “a little familiar”, “neutral”), they were asked if they could give an example (yes/no question). Those who answered yes were prompted to provide a written example.

This design contrasts with Bellamy’s (2023), who presented survey participants with ten examples of climate tipping points identified in the literature and asked for self-reported familiarity with these. We purposefully did not present participants with a definition or examples but sought to elicit information about their knowledge based on participants ability to recall examples themselves. This limits the influence of biases like socially desirable responding (e.g., projecting knowledgeability).

For part 2 of the survey, participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions, receiving different kinds of climate change information in text form. The participants in Group 1 were asked to read a text that introduced them to the concept of climate tipping points and included specific characteristics of tipping points identified in the literature (non-linear and abrupt change, irreversibility of climate change, system interactions and domino effects). The text for Group 2 presented more general information about climate change (without terminology pertaining to climate tipping points). Each text took 2-3 minutes to read. The text was presented in Norwegian (English translations in Appendix A).

In part 3, all participants were asked the same questions presented in part 1a about their risk perceptions related to climate change. We also asked to what extent they agree with the statement that “it was too late to do anything about climate change” in order to capture any indicators of effects on fatality from the intervention.

The survey design is visualised in Figure 2.
Our survey was conducted by an external Norwegian data collection unit (Opinion) in October-November 2022. A nationally representative sample of participants was recruited from a pool of over 8000. Our sample included 851 adults ranging from 18 – 91 years of age with a 50/50 split between men and women from all regions of Norway (northern Norway, 9%; central Norway, 14%; west Norway, 20%; east Norway, 30%; south Norway, 14%; Oslo, 13%) and did not favour any specific characteristics (pro-environmental views, political orientation, etc.).
3.2 Analysis

We used a primarily qualitative approach to assess knowledge and a statistical analysis to analyse changes in risk perceptions.

- Knowledge

Using data from pre-intervention questions about knowledge, and adjusting Milkoreit’s (2019) approach, we categorised participants into four different levels of knowledge (no knowledge, incorrect knowledge, some knowledge, good knowledge).

To assess the level of knowledge among participants, we developed a codebook that reflected the existing scholarship on climate tipping points, especially the four main characteristics of tipping points identified by Milkoreit et al. (2018, 2022), and sixteen examples based on Lenton et al. (2008) and Armstrong McKay et al. (2022).

Participants who indicated that they were not familiar with the concept of climate tipping points at all, or that they had ‘little knowledge’ were categorised as having “no knowledge”. Among the remaining participants, those who indicated that they could not provide an example were also categorised as having no knowledge. Similarly, if a participant answered yes but then did not provide a response to the prompt for an example, they were also categorised as not having knowledge. It is possible that some of these participants had knowledge on climate tipping points but did not provide written examples for reasons other than inability to recall this information, e.g., time constraints or a general unwillingness to answer open-ended questions. However, we assumed that the most likely reason for not providing any text was the inability to provide relevant information due to the lack of usable knowledge.

Participants who responded to the prompt were categorised based on the content of their answer, distinguishing incorrect, some and good knowledge. The answers contained both examples of tipping elements, such as “arctic sea ice” or “Gulfstream”, and more general descriptions of the concept, such as “point of no return” or “an irreversible event”.

1. No Self-Reported or Demonstrated Knowledge: self-reported lack of familiarity with climate tipping points, or self-reported inability to provide an example, or an inability to provide an example.
2. Incorrect Knowledge: self-reported knowledge and ability to provide an example, but inability to provide a correct example of a tipping element or any description (feature) that could be associated with climate tipping points.
3. Some Knowledge: identified one or two features of climate tipping points or one example, indicating a limited but incomplete understanding of the concept.
4. Good Knowledge: identified multiple (3 or more) features of climate tipping points and/or one or more correct examples, indicating a good understanding of the concept.

We counted how often specific climate-tipping elements were mentioned by participants. Here it was necessary to distinguish types/classes of tipping elements and specific examples within each type. The different types included cryosphere tipping elements/ice sheets, circulation patterns in the oceans and atmosphere, and biosphere tipping elements. Some participants referred to these types of tipping elements, while others provided more specific examples, such as the West Antarctic Ice Sheet.
or the Amazon rainforest. Based on these counts, we assessed which known tipping elements the public is currently most familiar with.

● Risk Perceptions

Our survey data were quantitatively analysed using data analysis tools in Microsoft Excel in order to identify any effect on climate risk perceptions post-intervention between the two groups (t-Test: two sample assuming unequal variances) and within the same group (t-Test: paired two sample for means). Significance tests were performed on the data in order to identify any statistically significant differences in responses on concern levels for climate change post-intervention.

4.0 Results

4.1 General State of Knowledge of climate tipping points

When asked about their self-reported level of familiarity with climate tipping points, 28% indicated moderate or good levels of familiarity, 16% were neutral, 50% indicated little or no familiarity, and 6% were unsure or did not know. When combining these data on self-reported knowledge with our analysis of responses to the prompt about examples, the share of participants without knowledge increases significantly to 81.1% (n=690). About 44% (n=372) of the participants who indicated some knowledge on climate tipping points were asked whether they could give an example of a climate tipping point, 56% (n=208) answered no. Among those who answered yes to this question, 52 did not provide an example or provided incorrect descriptions when prompted. Given this lack of ability to recall information about climate tipping points, we assess that ⅘ of Norwegians are unfamiliar with the concept in the sense that their understanding is insufficient to meaningfully inform a person’s risk perceptions related to climate change.

A small but significant number of participants, who had indicated that they were able to provide an example of a climate tipping point, provided incorrect responses. These included descriptions of climate change generally, such as “global warming” or “increasing average global temperatures”.

From these results and examples given by participants qualitatively coded, our final results on the levels of knowledge are as follows. Out of the total number of participants (n=851), 81.1% (n=690) had no knowledge of climate tipping points while 6.1% (n=52) indicated that they were familiar with the concept but provided incorrect characteristics or examples of climate tipping points, 11.5% (n=98) had some knowledge of climate tipping points, and the responses of 1.3% (n=11) indicated a good understanding of climate tipping points (see Figure 3).
After the intervention participants were asked whether the text they had read contained information that was new to them. A higher percentage (27%) of participants who read the text on climate tipping points agreed that the information was new to them compared with the general climate change group (17%). This difference was highly statistically significant ($t(848) = -5.98266, p < 0.05$). However, this result does not align with the result of participants indicating a lack of familiarity with the concept of climate tipping points in part 1b of the survey (more than 50%). This disparity between initial self-report of knowledge and post-experimental assessment of the information’s novelty indicates reliability problems regarding self-report data, possibly linked to a desire for socially desirable responses.

### 4.2 Characteristics of Climate Tipping Points

Further, we counted how often specific characteristics of tipping points were mentioned by participants to identify the most common features in public perceptions. The results are summarised in Table 1.
Table 1: Most commonly identified features of climate tipping points identified by participants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Share of Participants (N = 161) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Irreversibility</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Feedbacks</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Critical Threshold</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Abruptness/non-linearity</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Multiple stable states</td>
<td>4</td>
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The feature most commonly mentioned by participants was irreversibility, with some using the term “irreversible” directly, or phrases such as “unable to turn back” or “point of no return”. Participants mentioning feedback used phrases such as “self-reinforcing loops” or, more frequently, described feedback loops, such as “less ice allows more light absorption which leads to more ice melting”. Participants used terms including “threshold”, “boundary” or “limit” that is crossed to refer to critical thresholds. For abruptness and non-linearity participants used terms such as “escalating” to describe change or stated that climate change will happen “even faster”. The idea of multiple stable states was described with the terms “unstable” “fluctuating”, or “change from one system to another”. Other features such as severe impacts and uncertainty were not mentioned often enough to be considered part of a common understanding.
4.3 Examples of Climate Tipping Points

By far, the most frequently identified type of tipping points were those related to the cryosphere - 71 mentions (provided by 61 participants, some mentioning multiple elements) referred to ice loss, especially the Greenland Ice Sheet and the Arctic Sea Ice. The majority of these referred to “ice melting” or “polar ice” and “glaciers disappearing” without specific geographical reference. Some participants referred to “glaciers” but did not specify if these were mountain glaciers specifically, therefore these responses were coded as ice loss generally. More specific examples included “permafrost”, the Greenland ice sheet, and the loss of sea ice in the Arctic.

The second most frequent type of tipping element was circulation patterns (7 mentions) followed by biosphere components (4 mentions). Mentions of circulation patterns included mentions of “the Gulfstream” or “ocean currents”, and one mention of “air currents”. Regarding biosphere components, only one person identified the “coral reefs” and two the “Amazon rainforest”.

The results are summarised in Figure 4.

![Figure 4: Most commonly and correctly identified climate tipping elements by participants.](https://doi.org/10.5194/esd-2023-23)

4.4 Effect of climate tipping points on Level of Concern for Climate Change

All participants were asked about their concerns about climate change before and after our intervention. A two-sample t-test was performed on the responses prior to the intervention and found no statistical significance between Groups 1 and 2 prior to our intervention ($t(847) = -0.94$, p>0.05).

After being asked to read their respective texts, participants in both groups were asked again about their level of concern about climate change. A two-sample t-test was performed and found that the difference between Group 1 and Group 2 was significant ($t(849) = -1.99$, p< 0.05) with more participants in Group 1 who were presented with information about climate tipping points being more concerned than Group 2 post-intervention. The difference in responses post-intervention for the two groups is...
illustrated in Figure 6. The biggest change in responses before and after our intervention was that some who agreed before the intervention that they were concerned about climate change, completely agreed that they are personally concerned after the intervention. Both Groups 1 and 2 saw shifts of this nature, however, Group 1 who were presented with information on climate tipping points saw a higher degree of difference post-intervention.

![Figure 5: Percentage difference in climate risk perceptions post intervention per Group (Group 1: climate tipping points text; Group 2: climate change general text)](image)

A paired t-test for means was performed on Group 1 between their level of concern before and after the intervention. The results indicate that the responses from Group 1 were significantly different post-intervention (t(419) = 2.72, p<0.05). The same test was carried out for Group 2 and it was found that the difference in response post-intervention was not statistically significant (t(430) = -0.07, p > 0.05).

We asked participants post-intervention to what degree they agreed or disagreed that it was “too late” to do anything about climate change. We find that a majority of participants either completely disagree (24%) or disagree (36%) and few completely agreeing (4%) or agreeing (8%) that it is too late. There was little difference between the two groups and we found no significant difference between Groups 1 and 2 post-intervention (t(848) = -0.088, p > 0.05).

### 5.0 Discussion

Despite our expectations that knowledge of climate tipping points would be more limited than knowledge of climate change in general, we were surprised to find that less than 20 percent of respondents self-declared and demonstrated familiarity with the concept. Ultimately, only 13% of Norwegians have an understanding of climate tipping points that can serve as a foundation.
for risk assessments and potential behavioural changes. For the large majority of Norwegians, knowledge of climate tipping points does not yet affect judgements of climate risk. Comparing our assessment to that of Bellamy (2023), the state of public knowledge in Norway is significantly weaker than that in the UK. Bellamy reported that 25% of British study participants had not heard of climate tipping points before taking their survey, and that awareness of the issue is still low in the UK. These observations could be indicative of more limited media communication on climate tipping points in Norway compared to British and international press, but they could also be indicators of the learning challenges related to tipping processes as complex systems dynamics that defy mechanistic causal thinking. Reporting on climate tipping points has been increasing over the last five years, but with limited effects on public understanding so far. Given this baseline of limited knowledge paired with cognitive and emotional barriers to learning, it is likely that our experimental intervention - a short, fact-based description of climate tipping points - had very limited effects on risk perceptions because of its limited potential to contribute to learning and understanding.

Creating broad and meaningful public understanding climate tipping points might be more challenging than both the scientific and media communities realise. More frequent, more expansive, more emotional, visual, and story-based information might be needed to convey the meaning and potential implications of this concept. This could be explored through in-depth interviews or focus groups to gain a deeper perspective into the learning mechanisms, barriers, and challenges associated with climate tipping points rather than climate change more generally. Interventions that rely on alternative learning strategies should be explored, as illustrated by van Beek et al. (2022), who combined role play, active learning strategies and storytelling to increase understanding of climate tipping points with promising results. Formanski et al. (2022) suggests comparing active and passive learning strategies in order to further investigate how climate tipping points are understood. Our analysis provides modest evidence for the hypothesis that climate tipping point communication can increase public concern about climate change compared to more conventional, linear descriptions of climate change (Lenton et al., 2008; Russill, 2015). We observed that the strongest change in risk perceptions occurs among those who already are concerned about climate change, which aligns with findings by van Beek et al. (2022), although our survey-embedded experiment was significantly less engaging than the serious game deployed in their study. Our results contrast with recent findings by Formanski et al. (2022) who found no difference in risk perceptions between participants presented with portrayals of linear versus non-linear climate change. One explanation for this difference might be that Formanski et al focused on a single characteristic of tipping points (non-linearity), which might not be the feature that generates most concern. We found that irreversibility was the most commonly identified feature of climate tipping points, similar to findings by Milkoreit (2019) from surveys with international policymakers. It could be argued that people are concerned about the permanence of losses rather than the speed of change, especially when irreversibility is combined with the possibility of severe harm (‘catastrophic risks’). While we cannot conclude this from our study, it opens up pathways for future research.

We did not observe any effect of information of climate tipping points on beliefs about whether or not it is too late to act on climate change. This could be attributed to the public’s tendency to downplay the seriousness of these risks due to certain cognitive biases, and that systematic risk associated with climate tipping points pose unique learning challenges that is not
easily grasped by participants (Schweizer et al., 2022). However, Bellamy (2023) finds that there is strong doubt amongst participants about humanity’s response to climate tipping points, aligning more closely with fatalistic views of climate tipping points found by Bellamy and Hulme (2011). There is likely a complex relationship between climate tipping points and negative effects on participants’ risk perceptions of climate change. To reveal subtler, potential negative effects (e.g., increasing negative emotions, decreasing sense of personal agency) of climate tipping points on climate risk perceptions would however require more in depth and interdisciplinary research methodologies.

Cryosphere elements are the most correctly identified and commonly mentioned examples of climate tipping points in our study. This may be due to the fact that Arctic Sea ice was the first Earth system component to be associated with tipping points (Winton, 2006), and likely also its significance to Norway being proximal to the Arctic. The prominence of ice-related examples may also be due to the rather simple cause-and-effect relationship between higher temperatures and melting ice sheets, and the prevalence of cryosphere change in visual media reporting, e.g., eye-catching photos of polar-bears on (disappearing) ice-bergs. The reasons for the differential popularity, recognizability and attention to of various tipping elements should be explored in future research. While summer sea ice is no longer considered to have a tipping point (Armstrong McKay et al., 2022), other elements of the cryosphere (e.g., Greenland Ice Sheet, West Antarctic Ice Sheet) remain policy relevant climate tipping points with significant impacts on human systems. More surprising is the lack of public awareness of the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation as a potential tipping point with potentially dramatic consequences for Norway and all Atlantic states. Recent studies find that this potential climate tipping element is at its weakest in 1600 years (Boers, 2021; Thornalley et al., 2018) and is at risk of crossing a tipping point as early as 2025 (Ditlevsen & Ditlevsen, 2023).

Major questions remain regarding how to best communicate the risks of climate change, balancing information about threats with motivation to act and managing a complicated medley of emotions, including fear and apathy. This discussion is particularly relevant for Norway with the paradoxical gap between the political acceptance of climate risks and continued oil exploration, as well the apparent widespread ignorance or denial of climate change (PERITA, 2022; YouGov, 2019). While communicating risk based scientific predictions of potential tipping points should motivate climate action among both politicians and voters, the concept is hardly known, and partially misunderstood. One could argue that in Norway, a general feeling of safety, trust in government and technological solutions are widespread, creating a kind of hubris with regard to climate risks that can only be overcome by personal experience as the situation worsens (cf. Lujala et al., 2015). However, there is major potential to increase the scale and effectiveness of public communication about the risks of climate tipping points. Future research should seek to support the development of effective communication strategies, considering national differences, including differences in cultural worldviews (Bellamy 2023).

6.0 Conclusion

Understanding climate change risk perceptions is crucial for effective communication, policymaking, and public engagement. Climate tipping points, while presenting a range of threats to societies, might also provide new communication tools and
opportunities to reshape existing climate change narratives, public risk perceptions, engagement, and support for climate action.

Our study investigated the level of knowledge of climate tipping points among participants in Norway, and assessed whether information pertaining to climate tipping points has a different impact on climate change risk perceptions compared with information on climate change more generally.

We find a widespread lack of knowledge about climate tipping points among Norwegians, suggesting that the topic remains “new” for the majority of the population despite its increasing presence in the media. This situation merits further investigation, focusing on the question how to best support public learning and meaning making related to tipping points, including active learning strategies (Beek et al. 2022; Formanski et al. 2022). Future work should not only consider the role of cultural cognition in the adoption of this concept, but also emotional and social barriers to learning, such as psychological distancing, identity protection and socially organised denial (Norgaard, 2011).

Our results indicate a moderate impact of information about climate tipping points on risk perceptions of Norwegians. We suspect that these small effects are linked to the general state of public knowledge in Norway and the limited effects of our intervention on participants’ understanding of the concept and its potential implications for human wellbeing.

Our research explores the larger question of whether and how social awareness and potential positive societal tipping points can counteract the potentially dangerous tipping points in the climate system (Milkoreit et al., 2018; Winkelmann et al., 2022). Examples of proposed social tipping dynamics to bring about climate action include knowledge/information feedbacks (Otto et al., 2020), governance and policy interventions (Otto et al., 2020; Sharpe and Lenton, 2021), social norms (Nyborg et al., 2016), business initiatives and informal peer enforcement (Otto et al., 2020). Bellamy (2023) states that to understand and encourage such social tipping points, we must address different cultural worldviews that exist in any complex social system, and rather than attempting to make people with different worldviews think the same way, social tipping points should focus on aligning actions in support of climate policies. Related to this, our work raises questions regarding the role of knowledge, its absence, creation, and interactions with cultural worldviews to shape public climate risk perceptions.

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**Competing Interests**

The contact author has declared that none of the authors has any competing interests.
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