



1 **Climate change as a driver of future human migration**

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12 **Abstract**

13 Human migration is both motivated and constrained by a multitude of socioeconomic and
14 environmental factors, including climate-related factors. Climatic factors exert an influence on
15 local and regional population density. Here, we examine implications for future motivation for
16 humans to migrate by analyzing today's relationships between climatic factors and population
17 density, with all other factors held constant. Such 'all other factors held constant' analyses are
18 unlikely to make quantitatively accurate predictions but the order-of-magnitude and spatial pattern
19 that come out of such an analysis can help inform discussions about the influence of climate change
20 on the possible scale and pattern of future incentives to migrate. Our results indicate that, within
21 decades, climate change may provide to hundreds of millions of people additional incentive to
22 migrate, largely from warm tropical and subtropical countries to cooler temperate countries, with
23 India being the country with the greatest number of people with additional incentive to migrate.
24 These climate-driven incentives would be among the broader constellation of incentives that
25 influence migration decisions. Areas with the highest projected population growth rates tend to be
26 areas that are likely to be most adversely affected by climate change.

27



28 **1. Introduction**

29 Human migration is a complex socioeconomic phenomena driven by mixture of historical, political,
30 cultural, economic and geographical factors (Greenwood 1985), often by the need to adapt to
31 environmental stressors (Adger et al. 2014) including those caused by climate change (Myers 1993;
32 Núñez et al. 2002; Stapleton et al. 2017; Missirian and Schlenker 2017). Climate change is
33 expected to lead to higher temperatures and an altered hydrological cycle in the coming decades
34 (McLeman and Hunter 2010), and temperature and precipitation changes have been shown to
35 influence human migration at local to regional scale (Barrios et al. 2006; Black et al. 2011;
36 Marchiori et al. 2012; Gray and Bilsborrow 2013; Hsiang et al. 2013; Mueller et al. 2014; Bohra-
37 Mishra et al. 2014; Kelley et al. 2015).

38 We apply a simple and transparent approach to estimate the number and geographic distribution
39 of people for whom temperature and precipitation changes may provide an additional incentive
40 migrate. Of course, people are subject to a wide range of incentives and constraints; therefore,
41 actual future migration will depend on a much broader set of factors (Greenwood 1985; Adger et
42 al. 2014). Ideally, projections of future human migration patterns would involve consideration of
43 a wide range difficult-to-quantify factors (e.g., future wealth, efficacy of adaptive response,
44 cultural factors, and non-linear interactions between climate change and population growth)
45 (Holobinko 2012; Suweis 2018). Our goal is to identify what continuance of current relationships
46 between climate variables and human population density would imply for future incentives to
47 migrate. While these relationships will not remain fixed in time, it is nonetheless useful to
48 understand what direct application of current relationships to future climate would contribute to
49 the set of incentives that will influence future human migration.

50



51 2. Methods

52 2.1 Overview

53 Nordhaus (2006) applied a regression analysis on geographic and economic data to estimate the
54 influence of climate variables on the areal density of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Samson et
55 al. (2011) used weighted regression model to identify ideal temperature and precipitation ranges
56 for human habitation (as measured by population density), and studied how those ideal temperature
57 and precipitation ranges may change in the future owing to climate change. Here we apply similar
58 methods to the same dataset, the Geographically based Economic data (G-Econ), to estimate the
59 influence of climate variables on population density.

60 To estimate of the influence of climate on the attractiveness of different locations, we apply the
61 historical relationship between climate variables and population density, along with projections
62 (Taylor et al. 2012) of future climate change from the output of the Coupled Model
63 Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) under Representative Concentration Pathways (Vuuren
64 et al. 2011) (RCPs, including RCP 2.6, RCP 4.5, RCP 6.0 and RCP 8.5) scenarios, incorporating
65 future country-scale demographic population projections from the United Nations' World
66 Population Prospects 2015 (United Nations, 2015). Details are in the Analysis section below, but
67 the basic idea is that if, for example, historical relationships between population density and
68 climate change would predict a 10% decrease in population density for a grid cell in a climate
69 change scenario, we would estimate that there would be incentive for 10% of the future population
70 (as estimated by the UN) to migrate from that grid cell. Of course, many other factors including
71 family ties, linguistic barriers, lack of resources, employments relations, and so on, would be
72 expected to influence migration decisions.



73

74 2.2 Data

75 This research uses the Geographically based Economic data (G-Econ) dataset (Nordhaus 2006) for
76 the historical climate and population data. The G-Econ dataset is originally developed for
77 analyzing global economic activities and provides gridded ($1^\circ \times 1^\circ$) economic (e.g. Gross Cell
78 Product, population) and geographical (e.g., climate, location, country, distance from seacoasts,
79 soils and vegetation cover) information covering all terrestrial regions. In total, there are 27,445
80 grid cells in the dataset. G-Econ's climatology data, including annual mean air temperature (T ,
81 in $^\circ\text{C}$) and annual precipitation (P , in mm year^{-1}), were derived from the Climate Research Unit
82 Average Climatology high-resolution data sets (New et al. 2002). The gridded population (N) was
83 adapted from the Gridded Population of the World (GPW) dataset
84 (<http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/collection/gpw-v3>). More details and the data download
85 link is available at <http://gecon.yale.edu/>.

86 In this study, from the G-Econ dataset, we used the population density (D) and the geographical
87 data, including T , P , distance to lake (DL , in km), distance to major river (DMR , in km), distance
88 to river (DR , in km), distance to ocean (DO , in km), elevation (E , in m), and surface roughness
89 ($Roughness$, in m).

90 To make our projections, we used T and P in historical (*i.e.*, 1960-2005) climate, and future climate
91 scenarios (2006-2100) from the output of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5
92 (CMIP5), which produces state-of-art multi-model dataset to advance the knowledge of climate
93 change. We collected the model projected T and P (20 model projects; see Table A1) under all
94 Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs, including RCP 2.6, RCP 4.5, RCP 6.0 and RCP



95 8.5) from CMIP5 dataset to represent the range of future climate projections. We regridded the
96 CMIP5 data to a $1^\circ \times 1^\circ$ common grid using bilinear interpolation.

97 We used the historical and predicted (median-variant) country-level population data from the
98 World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision by the United Nations Department of Economic
99 and Social Affairs (United Nations, 2015). We use $W_{i,y}$ to denote the population estimated by the
100 UN for grid cell i in year y ; we use $W_{c,y}$ to denote the population estimated by the UN for country
101 c in year y .

102 2.3 Analysis

103 *Year 2005 population density and within-country distribution.* Areal population density for year
104 2005 in each grid cell i (D_i) was calculated from the population (N_i) of 2005, grid area (A_i , in km^2)
105 and land fraction of the grid (L_i , no unit) from G-Econ dataset:

$$106 \quad D_i = N_i / (A_i \times L_i) \quad (1)$$

107 We denote the fraction of population of country c living in grid cell i with the symbol $d_{i,c}$:

$$108 \quad d_i = N_i / \sum_{i \in c} N_i \quad (2)$$

109 where $i \in c$ indicates that the summation is performed over all grid cells in country c . The
110 distributional parameter, $d_{i,c}$, is considered to be constant in time.

111 *Linear regression model.* Our methods for estimating climate influence on population density
112 parallels methods previously applied (Nordhaus 2006) to estimate climate influence on areal
113 density of GDP. The basic idea is to find a single set of coefficients that explain within-country
114 relationships between population, climatic and geographic variables. For our regressions, we used



115 data from the G-Econ dataset¹⁸ and the Climate Research Unit Average Climatology high-
116 resolution data sets²⁷ (for filling the missing data in the G-Econ dataset). To estimate logarithm of
117 population density from both geographical (**G**) and climatic variables (**C**), we used the equation:

$$118 \quad \log_{10} D = \beta_0 + \mathbf{G}\boldsymbol{\beta}_G + \mathbf{C}\boldsymbol{\beta}_C \quad (3)$$

119 where D is a vector of grid-scale population densities (i.e., D_i for grid cell i). Specifically,

$$120 \quad \mathbf{G} = [\textit{country} \quad \textit{soil} \quad \textit{DL} \quad \textit{DMR} \quad \textit{DR} \quad \textit{DO} \quad \textit{E} \quad \textit{roughness}] \quad (4)$$

$$121 \quad \mathbf{C} = [T \quad T^2 \quad T^3 \quad p \quad p^2 \quad p^3 \quad Tp \quad T^2p \quad p^2T] \quad (5)$$

122 where T is as defined above, and p is $\log_{10} P$. *country* and *soil* are categorical variables, $\boldsymbol{\beta}_G$ and $\boldsymbol{\beta}_C$
123 are numerical coefficients vector on geographical and climatic variables, respectively.

$$124 \quad \boldsymbol{\beta}_G = \text{Transpose} [\beta_{G,\textit{country}} \quad \beta_{G,\textit{soil}} \quad \beta_{G,\textit{DL}} \quad \beta_{G,\textit{DMR}} \quad \beta_{G,\textit{DR}} \quad \beta_{G,\textit{DO}} \quad \beta_{G,\textit{E}} \quad \beta_{G,\textit{roughness}}] \quad (6)$$

125 and

$$126 \quad \boldsymbol{\beta}_C = \text{Transpose} [\beta_{C,T} \quad \beta_{C,T^2} \quad \beta_{C,T^3} \quad \beta_{C,p} \quad \beta_{C,p^2} \quad \beta_{C,p^3} \quad \beta_{C,Tp} \quad \beta_{C,T^2p} \quad \beta_{C,p^2T}] \quad (7)$$

127 Antarctica, Greenland, and grid cells with zero precipitation were excluded from this analysis.

128 The values for the β -coefficients are determined by an area-weighted ordinary-least-squares curve
129 fit to $\log_{10} D$. Fitting the above linear regression model was conducted in MATLAB R2017a
130 (<http://www.mathworks.com/products/matlab/>). In total, 20,503 grid cells had data for all
131 parameters needed for the fitting procedure. Variability that is not explained by equation (3) is
132 assumed to be the result of unknown factors which we treat as invariant with time.



133 *Population change projections.* We first calculated the ratio of population in the changed climate
134 relative to the base-state climate (here taken to be the climate in the period preceding 2005) in
135 region i for the climate in year y considering climate factors alone ($r_{i,y}$):

$$136 \quad r_{i,y} = \frac{D_{i,y}}{D_{i,2005}} \quad (8)$$

137 For each grid, we calculated $r_{i,y}$ for each year from 2006 to 2100 using equation (8) and 30-year
138 moving average of T and P projected by each CMIP5 model. (The 30-year moving average ends
139 on the period under consideration so that decisions are made on past but not future climate states.)

140 In the absence of climate change, we would estimate the population in grid cell i in country c for
141 year y ($W_{i,y}$) to be $d_{i,c} \times W_{c,y}$, where c is the country containing grid cell i . If we directly apply the
142 population change ratio under climate change ($r_{i,y}$) to the population estimates, the population with
143 taking climate change into account would be $r_{i,y} \times W_{i,y}$. However, this estimate must be scaled to
144 conserve total population. Thus, the population $N_{i,y}$ of grid cell i in year y can be estimated to be:

$$145 \quad N_{i,y} = r_{i,y} \times W_{i,y} \times \frac{\sum_{i \in c} d_{i,c} \times W_{c,y}}{\sum_{i \in c} r_{i,y} \times d_{i,c} \times W_{c,y}} \quad (9)$$

146 By doing this adjustment, we conserve the world total population, but take climate change into
147 account to estimate the spatial distribution of population.

148 We then estimate the number of people for whom climate change is projected to provide additional
149 incentive to migrate for grid-cell i and year y (indicated by $\Delta N_{i,y}$) as:

$$150 \quad \Delta N_{i,y} = N_{i,y} - W_{i,y} \quad (10)$$




151 Negative values of ΔN_i are interpreted as indicating areas where climate change provides
152 additional incentive to emigrate; positive values indicate areas that are projected to increase in
153 relative attractiveness. (Even if everywhere were to decrease in absolute attractiveness due to
154 climate change, the places with a smaller absolute decrease would increase in relative
155 attractiveness.)

156 We define $f_{i,y} = N_{i,y} / W_{i,y}$, so that $f_{i,y} - 1$ indicates the fractional change in population that would
157 be required to offset the influence of climate change on the attractiveness of grid cell i in year y .
158 When $f_{i,y} - 1 < 0$, that means that grid cell i has become less attractive. We integrated $N_{i,y}$ for grid
159 cells in each country c to yield $N_{c,y}$ and define $f_{c,y} = N_{c,y} / W_{c,y}$. We calculate results independently
160 for each of the CMIP5 models simulations (Taylor et al. 2012) and present median results.

161 Where a range is reported, it encompasses results for 68% of the CMIP5 models.

162 We report results with two significant digits. The computer scripts written in Matlab R2017a used
163 to perform our analyses are available upon request.

164



165

166 Figure 1. The number of people for whom climate change is projected to provide additional incentive to
167 migrate under RCP 8.5 per $1^\circ \times 1^\circ$ grid cell ($\Delta N_{i,2100}$, in thousand people, panel a) and per country ($\Delta N_{c,2100}$,
168 in billion people, panel b). The fractional change in population that would be required to offset the influence
169 of climate change on the relative attractiveness of living in a particular location for year 2100 ($f_{i,2100}$) under
170 scenario RCP 8.5 (c). To isolate the effect of climate change on incentives to migrate, all factors are held
171 constant, except for climate and country-level population. Of course, many other factors influence
172 migration decisions.



173 Results

174 The regression of population density against geographic and climate variables as described above
175 (see also Methods and Supporting Material) explains 72% of the geographic variance in the
176 logarithm of population density. Applying our regression equation to climate model and
177 demographic projections, we find that $\Delta N_{i,y}$ is negative (i.e., indicating decreased attractiveness)
178 in regions that are already hot and are projected to experience substantial additional warming under
179 climate change (primarily tropical and subtropical regions), whereas we find that $\Delta N_{i,y}$ is positive
180 (i.e., indicating increased attractiveness) in cooler regions (primarily in the temperate regions of
181 the Northern Hemisphere; Figure 1a and A1,a,b,c).


182 Under RCP 8.5, India has the largest negative $\Delta N_{c,2100}$ value among countries (0.89 [0.77 to 1.10]
183 billion; Figure 1b), followed by Nigeria (0.46 [0.38 to 0.58] billion). The other countries with the
184 largest negative values of $\Delta N_{i,2100}$ are Democratic Republic of Congo (0.20 billion), Indonesia
185 (0.18 billion), Niger (0.14 billion), Sudan (0.11 billion), Philippines (0.10 billion), Bangladesh
186 (0.09 billion), Tanzania (0.09 billion) and Pakistan (0.08 billion). In contrast, China, Russia and
187 the United States all have positive values of $\Delta N_{c,2100}$.

188 The metric $f_{i,2100}$ is less than 0.3 in parts of the Northern African Tropical Savanna, Tropical South
189 America and Tropical Asia under RCP 8.5, indicating that future incentives to migrate from those
190 areas may be substantial. The metric $f_{i,2100}$ is >5 in much of Canada, Russia and Scandinavia, and
191 parts of the United States, and China (Figure 1c), which could indicate that in the absence of other
192 barriers these regions could become migration destinations. Results for RCP 2.6, 4.5 and 6.0 show
193 similar spatial patterns but at lower magnitude (Figure A1).



194 The countries with the largest projected population growth to year 2100 tend to be countries where
195 the largest negative values of $\Delta N_{c,2100}$ (Fig. 2). The equation $\Delta N_{c,2100} = (1.79 \pm 0.06) \Delta W_{c,2100} +$
196 (0.21 ± 0.02) explains 79% of the variation in population-weighted $\Delta N_{c,2100}$ (best estimate ± 1
197 standard error). Figure 2 shows average projected population increase from 2005 to 2100 ($\Delta W_{c,2100}$)
198 on the horizontal axis is negatively correlated to the number of people in each country with
199 additional incentive to emigrate ($\Delta N_{c,2100}$) on the vertical axis. About 70% of the world's projected
200 year 2100 population lives in a country that is expected to experience population growth and for
201 which $\Delta N_{c,2100}$ is < 0 (lower right quadrant in Fig. 2). In contrast, 14% of the global population in
202 2100 is projected to live in a country experiencing with a population lower than today and for
203 which $\Delta N_{c,2100}$ is > 0 (upper left quadrant in Fig. 2). Similar patterns are found under other
204 scenarios (Fig. A2).


205 Figures 3 shows values of $\Delta N_{i,y}$ integrated over all grid cells with $\Delta N_{i,y} < 0$, indicating the number
206 of people for whom climate change for whom climate change may produce an additional incentive
207 to migrate. Under all of the RCP scenarios, this integrated value increases over the next few
208 decades (Figure 3), reaching 0.6 to 1.9 billion people by 2050 (depending on RCP scenario). By
209 year 2100 under RCP 8.5, this number increases to about 3.8 [3.3 to 4.9] billion people, which is
210 about one-third of the projected global population in 2100.



211

212 Figure 2. Country-level projections for population increase in year 2100 relative to year 2005
213 ($\Delta W_{c,2100} = W_{c,2100} - W_{c,2005}$, horizontal axis) and the number of people for whom climate change is projected
214 to provide additional incentive to migrate under RCP 8.5 ($\Delta N_{c,2100}$; vertical axis). Areas of circles are
215 proportional to year 2100 population. Color scale is as per Figure 1b. The line shows the population-
216 weighted linear trend. Negative values on the vertical axis indicate additional incentive to emigrate; positive
217 values indicate countries that increase in relative attractiveness. Results hold all factors constant, except for
218 climate and country-level population.

219



220

221 Figure 3. Number of people projected to experience additional climate-related incentive to emigrate under
222 four Representative Concentration Pathways. The lines show the median value across CMIP5 models with
223 results from 66 % of the models falling within the shaded area. Results hold all factors constant, except for
224 climate and country-level population.

225



226 **Discussion and Conclusions**

227 In this section, we discuss some of the relevance of the results of our calculations for the real world.
228 We intend our quantitative results to indicate possible orders-of-magnitude and global-scale spatial
229 patterns of people with changed incentives; we do not intend our results to be interpreted as
230 quantitative predictions of future climate-induced human migration.

231 Our calculations take into account changes in temperature and precipitation only, under the
232 artificial assumption that all other factors remain constant. Our highly idealized calculations are
233 intended to indicate the scale and geographic distribution of people for whom climate change
234 might provide an additional incentive to migrate. Our calculations also indicate which regions
235 climate change might make more attractive to potential migrants. Clearly, migration decisions are
236 influenced by a wide range of factors (McLeman and Hunter 2010; Fussell et al. 2014). Further,
237 there is often a substantial incentive to avoid migration entirely, so additional incentive to migrate
238 does not imply an overall positive net incentive to migrate. The number of people who will have
239 positive net incentive to migrate as a result of climate change is thus less than the number of people
240 for whom climate change will provide an additional incentive to migrate. Migration is one of many
241 possible adaptive responses to climate change. For example, people might choose to cool interior
242 spaces with air conditioners (Barreca et al. 2016). Another response could be to shift from
243 agricultural work in rural environments to industrial or service-sector jobs in more urbanized
244 environments (Neill et al. 2010; Jiang and O'Neill 2017), and thus migration flows can be
245 influenced by differences in types of development and not only climatic factors.

246 Our results indicate that India may be the country that will contain the largest number of people to
247 whom climate change may provide an additional incentive to emigrate. West Africa, and in
248 particular, Nigeria, may be the second most important area in this regard (Figure 1a,b). This is



249 largely a consequence of high population densities in areas that are already warm and projected to
250 get warmer. Our results indicate that many people living in the Amazon region would have
251 additional incentive to emigrate, but population density is generally low. More generally, climate
252 change may provide additional incentive to emigrate to many people living in the tropics (Figure
253 1c). In contrast, our regression equations indicate that, from a purely climatic perspective, climate
254 change may increase the attractiveness of northern countries, such as China, Russia, Canada,
255 Norway, Sweden and Finland, relative to most other parts of the world.

256 There is a country-level correlation between projected population increase and the degree to which
257 climate change is projected to provide an additional incentive to emigrate. This correlation
258 suggests that population increases have the potential for exacerbating negative effects of climate
259 change in much of the world. Over two-thirds of the world's year 2100 population is projected to
260 live in a country with greater population than today and for which climate change may provide
261 additional incentive to emigrate. In contrast, about one out of seven people are projected to live in
262 a country with a lower population and where climate change may cause to become relatively more
263 attractive. China is the largest country that is expected to both experience a decrease in population
264 and an increase in climate-related relative attractiveness. Moreover, our calculations suggest that
265 India could be the largest potential source of climate emigrants, and that China could potentially
266 be the largest potential destination for climate immigrants (Figure 1b). However, immigration in
267 China is currently very limited (Abel and Sander 2014). Thus, barriers to migration in southeast
268 Asia could potentially become an important source of future climate-related conflict (Hsiang et al.
269 2013).

270 Climate change may provide additional incentive to migrate to hundreds of millions of people
271 within the next decades and potentially billions of people by the end of this century (Figure 3).



272 The number of people projected to have additional incentive to migrate by year 2100 under RCP
273 4.5 or 6.0 is about half that projected under RCP 8.5, and the number project under RCP 2.6 is
274 about half that projected under RCP 4.5 or 6.0. This result points to the important role that
275 emissions reductions may play in reducing climate-related incentives to migrate. Successful local
276 adaptation measures could greatly reduce incentives to migrate (Adger et al. 2014).

277 Climate change is likely to induce a complex web of dynamical interactions at a range of spatial
278 and temporal scales, and these interactions are not well represented by our model. For example,
279 considerations of language, work, and family ties can provide strong incentive not to migrate.
280 Projections of how climate change might affect migration are therefore fraught with uncertainty.
281 Nevertheless, the results of our calculations may indicate areas that climate change can be expected
282 provide large numbers of people, primarily in the tropics, an additional incentive to migrate,
283 primarily to the middle and high latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere. This change in climate-
284 driven incentives to migrate is one factor among many that need to be included in a comprehensive
285 understanding of possible future migration flows.

286

287 **Code/Data availability**

288 All the data used in this study is publicly available. The CMIP5 climate projections are available
289 at https://cmip.llnl.gov/cmip5/data_portal.html. The G-Econ dataset is available at
290 <http://gecon.yale.edu/>. The WPP2015 (World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision by the
291 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs) data is available at
292 <http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/>.

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367

368 **Author Contributions**

369 M. C. and K. C. conceived and designed the project and performed the computational analysis.
370 M.C. wrote the first draft of the manuscript with later development from K. C.

371

372 **Competing interests**

373 The author(s) declare no competing interests.

374




382 Table A1. CMIP5 models used in this study.

Model	Country and Research Center	Resolution (Latitude, Longitude)
CCSM4	United States, NCAR	(0.9424, 1.25)
CESM1-CAM5	United States, NCAR	(0.9424, 1.25)
CSIRO-Mk3.6.0	Australia, CSIRO	(1.8653, 1.875)
FIO-ESM	China, The First Institute of Oceanography, SOA	(2.8125, 2.8125)
GFDL-CM3	United States, NOAA/GFDL	(2, 2.5)
GFDL-ESM2G	United States, NOAA/GFDL	(2.0225, 2)
GFDL-ESM2M	United States, NOAA/GFDL	(2.0225, 2.5)
GISS-E2-H	United States, NASA GISS	(2, 2.5)
GISS-E2-R	United States, NASA GISS	(2, 2.5)
HadGEM2-AO	United Kingdom, MOHC	(1.25, 1.875)
IPSL-CM5A-LR	France, IPSL	(1.8947, 3.75)
IPSL-CM5A-MR	France, IPSL	(1.2676, 2.5)
MIROC-ESM	Japan, JAMSTEC; Atmosphere and Ocean Research Institute (AORI); National Institute for Environmental Studies (NIES)	(2.7906, 2.8125)
MIROC-ESM-CHEM	Japan, JAMSTEC; AORI; NIES	(2.7906, 2.8125)
MIROC5	Japan, JAMSTEC; AORI; NIES	(1.4008, 1.40625)
MRI-CGCM3	Japan, MRI	(1.12148, 1.125)
NorESM1-M	Norway, Norwegian Climate Centre	(1.8947, 2.5)
NorESM1-ME	Norway, Norwegian Climate Centre	(1.8947, 2.5)
BCC-CSM1.1	China, BCC	(2.8125, 2.8125)
BCC-CSM1.1-M	China, BCC	(1.125, 1.125)

383



384 Figure A1. The number of people for whom climate change is projected to provide additional
385 incentive to migrate under RCP 2.6, 4.5 and 6.0 per $1^\circ \times 1^\circ$ grid cell ($\Delta N_{i,2100}$, in thousand people)
386 and per country ($\Delta N_{c,2100}$, in billion people). The fractional change in population that would be
387 required to offset the influence of climate change on the relative attractiveness of living in a
388 particular location for year 2100 ($f_{i,2100}$) under the scenarios. The three rows presents $\Delta N_{i,2100}$,
389 $\Delta N_{c,2100}$ and $f_{i,2100}$ under RCP 2.6, 4.5 and 6.0 (columns), respectively. Color schemes are the same
390 as in Fig. 1. Results hold all factors constant, except for climate and country-level population.



391

392



393 Figure A2. Country-level projections for population increase in year 2100 relative to year 2005
394 ($\Delta W_{c,2100} = W_{c,2100} - W_{c,2005}$, horizontal axis) and the number of people for whom climate change is projected
395 to provide additional incentive to migrate under RCP 2.6, 4.5 and 6.0 ($\Delta N_{c,2100}$; vertical axis). Areas of
396 circles are proportional to year 2100 population. Color scale is as per Figure 2. The line shows the
397 population-weighted linear trend by fitting $\Delta N_{c,2100} = a\Delta W_{c,2100} + b$, where a and b are parameters. For RCP
398 2.6, $a = -0.49 \pm 0.06$, $b = 0.06 \pm 0.02$ (best estimate ± 1 standard error), and $R^2 = 0.80$; for RCP 4.5, $a =$
399 -0.92 ± 0.06 , $b = 0.10 \pm 0.02$, and $R^2 = 0.79$; for RCP 6.0, $a = -1.08 \pm 0.06$, $b = 0.13 \pm 0.02$, and $R^2 = 0.79$. Negative
400 values on the vertical axis indicate additional incentive to emigrate; positive values indicate countries that
401 increase in relative attractiveness. Results hold all factors constant, except for climate and country-level
402 population.

