

## ***Interactive comment on “Long-run evolution of the global economy: 2. Hindcasts of innovation and growth” by T. J. Garrett***

**T. Garrett**

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Review by Andrew Jarvis

This thoughtful, critical review has been extremely helpful at refining the manuscript. I am greatly appreciative of the effort that went into it.

**Garrett’s work on conceptualising the growth of industrial society from a thermodynamic perspective has influenced my work in this area significantly. This particular contribution reveals his evolving thinking on this very important subject. Much of what he presents is characteristically insightful and illuminating. However, I take issue with some aspects of the work as detailed below. My**

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**main concerns are as follows:**

**1. As with all our attempts to pitch into this area we feel the need to pay due respect to the current macroeconomic calculus. This is understandable, but I find there are certain areas where this paper abandons the original refreshing ‘it’s physics stupid’ perspective and starts to become quite macroeconomic itself. Perhaps that’s no bad thing if aiding communication is the intended goal, but I think this needs to be made clear rather than attempting to give the impression it is all first principles natural science (see specific comments below).**

The point is that, because  $\lambda$  appears to be a constant, the macroeconomics is simply an expression of the physics. It is more than just a matter of communication (although that effort is part of the exposition). The beginning of Section 2 now states this more clearly

*The basis for a model linking economics to physics is a fundamental identity that relates a monetary expression for wealth to how fast civilization as a whole is able to dissipate energy.*

**2. The paper focuses on evaluating the framework against GWP data specifically from 1950 to 2010. My first issue with this is that the thermodynamic framing should tend to favour the global primary energy use data, and if not why not? My second issue is that from my understanding of the data 1950 – 2010 represents one cycle of a wave and hence rather than being truly long-run as suggested by the title, the analysis is of a single wave of innovation.**

The thermodynamic framework does employ the global primary energy use data for the establishment of  $\lambda$  for the period from 1970 to 2010 since this is the period for which the global primary energy use data from the EIA are available and for which concurrent statistics of GWP are available from the UN. I appreciate the semantic argument over what counts as “long”. 1950 to 2010 could be seen as a wave of innovation, although not of growth since civilization growth has occurred for thousands of years, albeit at

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varying rates. The reason for choosing the word long-run is to make a connection to some of the language used in macroeconomics where the decadal timescales that are discussed would certainly be considered long.

**3. The balance of the paper needs changing slightly. Data need careful introduction as does the estimation of the various quantities. Repetition of material also in Garrett (2014) needs to be kept to a minimum.**

Much of the ground work, both theoretical and with regards to the datasets was established in Garrett (2014). The point of separating the work into parts was to establish the theoretical and empirical edifice first (Part I), test the dynamic model (Part II), and make predictions (Part III to come). Part I was in fact where much of the data introduction was made, with added material in the appendix

**I apologies in advance for the now 9 pages of comments, but this is important material and I find it fascinating. Please forgive any misunderstandings below. I very much want to see this work in print and I hope my review helps refine the paper to maximise its impact.**

**p657 “It tends to be the slowest and largest aspects of current variability that are the most powerful and least responsive.” It’s not clear what you mean by “current variability”.**

The paragraph is now rewritten and hopefully more clear

*What this might suggest is that the human system has inertia, much like physical systems. Current variability reflects past events. Persistent forces from the past tend to have the greatest influence on the present. They tend to continue to persist because they are least responsive to current small-scale rapid forces. Minor current events have a limited impact on the future because they become diluted in the history of actions that preceded them (Hasselmann 1976). One reason that it may appear so difficult to wean ourselves from fossil fuels today is that we have spent at least a century accumulating*

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*a large global infrastructure for their consumption. It is not that current efforts to move civilization towards renewables cannot change this trajectory of carbon dependency, but rather that it will take considerable effort and time.*

**p657 “Part 1 of this study describes a physical model that provides expressions for making long-range economic forecasts of civilization evolution (Garrett, 2014).” Need to be clear that Garrett (2014) is to be referred to as ‘Part 1’ hereafter.**

Done

**p657 “The model differs from IAMs by including no explicit role for human decisions; the physics does not allow for mathematical expressions of policy. Rather, economic innovation and growth is treated primarily as a geophysical phenomenon, in other words as an emergent response to available reserves of raw materials and energy supplies.” I think this is not entirely accurate. Human agents are still required to act such that the geophysical behaviours emerge and I think it would be helpful for the reader to make this clear.**

To clarify this issue the text now reads. *“Rather, economic innovation and growth is treated primarily as a geophysical phenomenon, in other words the totality of civilization is expressed as an emergent response to available reserves of raw materials and energy supplies. “*

**p658 “In the period following World War II, an economic “front” passed that propelled civilization towards unprecedented levels of prosperity and, by proxy, greenhouse gas emissions. This paper examines whether the theoretical model introduced in Part 1 can explain the evolution of this front.” Taken as a whole, far more time/space is dedicated to re-introducing Garrett (2014) than to a rigorous evaluation against data. If the paper is to retain this focus then I think this balance needs addressing. For example, more effort could be dedicated to detailing the exact data sources to be used and why, and following through the**

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uncertainties. Similarly, the introduction of the model could be trimmed back to the essentials given they are reported in detail in Garrett (2014). For example, section 2.1 is largely redundant in this context. The estimation of the various quantities needs explaining clearly in the main text.

The paper already tries to trim things back to essentials given that there is no lengthy derivation of the underlying terms for economic innovation and growth. What we have done is to move Section 2.1 to an appendix and shorten the conclusions section.

**p662 “Within civilization, wealth is due to the connections between and among ourselves and our “physical capital””. I don’t see the need for the direct quotes here. Also, this is speculation and needs expressing as such.**

I used quotes since “physical capital” since the expression is used in the traditional economics sense, not a physical one. The justification for the statement is elaborated upon in Part I, as mentioned, but the text is now added

*Within civilization, wealth is due to the connections between and among ourselves and our “physical capital”, from the circulations along transportation, telecommunications, and social networks.*

**p662 “All aspects of civilization, whether social or material, compete for globally available potential energy. Financial expressions of any element’s value reflect the relative extent to which its connections enable civilization to sustain global scale circulations and wealth.” This statement passes almost unnoticed and yet, for me, is probably one of the most important in the entire paper, especially when trying to help the reader appreciate the links between what they perceive and the analysis being presented. I suggest this is developed a little more here and revisited in the Conclusions. That said, given you are trying to describe ‘wealth’ you can’t use ‘wealth’ in the definition. Also, it is difficult to properly appreciate why the instantaneous circulations within societies networks (driven by energy use) relate to accumulated GWP rather than GWP. In all your writing I**

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have yet to hear this argument absolutely nailed. I appreciate this was the central discussion of your last ESDD paper (Garrett, 2011) but there is an opportunity here to really help the reader. I have read this section many times and still feel there is an unnecessary sleight of hand.

**p662 “Wealth emerges from the past through prior production of these connections. Value added to civilization through the construction of a house decades ago still contributes to value today, provided the house remains part of a network [which] ties it to the remainder of civilization. Even with no one home and all the utilities turned off, a house maintains its value for as long as it can be perceived by other active members of the global economy.” I understand the point you are trying to illustrate here. However, in relation to the preceding paragraph, by removing the inhabitants and unplugging the house it is not sustaining any material/energy flows at that point in time and hence under your physical definition of ‘value’ it’s value should drop dramatically. In effect it is being unplugged from the physical network. The alternative you allude to here is that there is a psychological dimension to ‘wealth’ partially decoupled from material/energy flows. It is as if the potential to support flows is as important as actually supporting flows. Clearly this is not traditional thermodynamics as you use it and is more like traditional economics, which needs spelling out.**

**p662 “Even with no one home and all the utilities turned off, a house maintains its value for as long as it can be perceived [as useful (or similar)] by other active members of the global economy.”**

The above three points are addressed now with revised text that reads

*Financial expressions of any element's value reflect the relative extent to which its connections enable civilization to irreversibly consume potential energy in order to sustain the reversible circulations of the global economy.*

*So while energy consumption is required to economically produce and grow, a gen-*

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erally much greater amount is required to sustain circulations within the network of connections that has been accumulated from prior production in the past. An analog is an adult human body since it is also a network of connections that has grown through childhood and adolescence. Far more of current daily food consumption goes towards maintaining life than to any extra weight gain. Here, value added to civilization through the construction of a house decades ago still contributes to value today, provided the house remains part of a network that supports civilization by supporting its inhabitants. Part of such value may be only psychological since, even with no one home and all the utilities turned off, a house still maintains some worth for as long as it can be perceived as potentially being useful by other active members of the global economy.

**p663 “the model is strictly thermodynamic”. I’m not entirely convinced. Although equation 1 makes a strong appeal to thermodynamics, and the energy use component is described as a thermodynamic growth process in Garrett (2011), it is necessarily derivative, exploiting some empirical arguments not least because it invokes economic measures such as GWP. There is also clearly a perceived quality to ‘wealth’ as you illustrate (see above).**

Once  $\lambda$  is established it is strictly thermodynamic as there are no further relations that are derived from empirical fits. The rest is just physics.

**p663 “in which case no requirement exists for dimensionally inconsistent fits to prior economic data that are dependent on the time and place that is considered. The model does not rest upon any statistical correlation between energy consumption and economic production. . .” But this is exactly how lambda is derived! Admittedly it is far less prone than it’s classical macroeconomic counterparts, but I think it is important to state clearly the true similarities and differences.**

This point is made more clear in the text which now reads

The constant  $\lambda$  is not derived from a correlation analysis (something that has been

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erroneously claimed by others Cullenward et al., 2011; Scher and Koomey, 2011), but instead it is obtained from the observation that the ratio of  $C$  to  $a$  does not change even though  $C$  and  $a$  do. This is much like the basic expression of quantum mechanics where it was initially assumed and then validated with measurements that a photon’s energy  $E$  and its frequency  $\nu$  are linked through Planck’s constant  $h$ . The interpretation is that, for the purposes of understanding the physics, the two quantities are interchangeable. The theoretical and empirical support for  $\lambda$  being effectively a constant is the basis for interpreting real global economic wealth, as it is defined, to be more fundamentally a representation of how civilization’s circulations are sustained by a dissipation of primary energy.

**p663 “and Y in units of 2005 MER US dollars per second”. Picking up on an earlier discussion with you about PPP and noting Herrmann-Pillath’s concerns about whether MER is the best measure, I think as a minimum there needs to be a discussion here about the data used to estimate lambda as there is for the evaluations presented later on. This discussion needs to articulate the uncertainties too.**

The text currently states *What was shown in Table S2 of Garrett (2014), and in graphical form in Fig. 3 is that, for the period 1970 to 2010 for which global statistics for power consumption are available, the mean value of  $\lambda$  is 7.1 milliwatts per 2005 US dollar. GWP more than tripled over this time period.*

**p664 “The basic reason is that, from Eq. (1), the [relative] growth rate of civilization. . .”**

Changed

**p664 “Since 1970, average rates of return for a and C have been [~]1.90% per year (Fig. 3)”.**

Changed

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p664 “So, the current rate of return is tied to [the] past. . .”

p664 “The rate of change of civilization’s rate of return can be referred to as an “innovation rate””. It is incongruous to specify the return rate as something that is changing at this stage because up until now you’ve been convincing the reader it is constant (1.9 %/yr). This needs some introduction.

To clarify a possible source of confusion, the text now reads

Since 1970, rates of return for  $a$  and  $C$  have varied, but have both averaged  $\sim 1.90$  % per year (Fig. 3).

p665 “Since  $\lambda$  is a constant, increases in the production efficiency (or inverse energy intensity)  $Y/a$  are equivalent to the expression for innovation  $d\ln\eta/dt$ .” I can see how the previous argument indicates your definition of ‘the return rate’ can increase because  $Y$  is growing faster than  $a$  but it is not clear how this supports eq. 7 explicitly. As you say, the introduction of eq. 7 is “a bit arbitrary” and I was surprised to see it defended from a heuristic economic perspective. As discussed above, this clearly is not a purely thermodynamic framing hereon.

If feel the mathematical and physical justification is already summarized in the text, although I have added the phrase “it follows that” to make it clearer that a derivation is implied.

p665 “Innovation is a driving force for economic growth since it follows directly from Eqs. (4) and (5) that the real GWP [relative] growth rate is governed by. . .”.

Changed

p665 “GWP [relative] growth = rate of return + innovation rate”. Also by now the term ‘return rate’ is becoming very ambiguous. Previously it related to energy use and wealth because you argue it is common to both. But we are now also thinking about the return rate on GWP and  $\eta$  too. I suggest return rates and/or relative growth rates are stated explicitly from the outset.

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The rate of return is defined explicitly with equation 4. Wealth and energy consumption are not the only things that grow, yes, but the rate of return is not used as an expression to describe other dynamic quantities.

p665 “The implication here is that current rates of GWP growth. . .” I understand that in an economic framing GWP growth is important, but for me it’s as if the paper is losing it’s thermodynamic roots. I think you need to keep reminding the reader what GWP represents in the thermodynamic setting.

The physical forces for the innovation that drives GWP are elaborated upon a bit later in the section now slightly renamed to emphasize this point “Physical forces for innovation”.

p665 “Accordingly, current GWP growth rates will tend to persist; new technological advances will always struggle to replace older advances that are already in place (Haff, 2014).” These are two separate issues that need discussing separately. The second one is really interesting and important and worth expanding on.

The text is now rewritten slightly to read

*The first term implies that current GWP growth rates will tend to persist because past innovation is carried to the present; the second term implies that new technological advances will always struggle to replace older advances that are already in place*

The elaboration is already exists in the following sentence.

p665 “Figure 4 shows how rates of return, innovation rates, and GWP growth...” Again ‘return rate’ and ‘GWP growth’ is very confusing as they are both relative growth rates. Also, my estimates of the return rate on global primary energy doesn’t look at all like this (see <http://www.earth-syst-dynam-discuss.net/5/1143/2014/esdd-5-1143-2014.html>), but rather looks much more like your estimates of innovation and GWP growth. I can only assume it is esti-

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mated from the time integrated (and hence smoothed) GWP data. If you used the global primary energy use data (which you ought to given this paper espouses thermodynamic principles) you would get a very different answer indeed. The data sources and estimation methods need to be put into this paper so the reader can see how this was done. “See Garrett, 2014” is not helpful.

Yes, there are relative growth rates for differing quantities, but they are named consistently. The paper referred to is currently in review, and my own review of that paper raised concerns about the completeness of the primary energy data sets that were used. They omitted key sources of renewable energy like wind and gravity that likely played critical roles in the past. As for presenting analyses based on referenced datasets, this is common practice.

**p666 “Meanwhile, innovation rates have declined.” When looking at the long-run evolution of global primary energy use you will see this decline is transient, similar to what was seen in the 1930’s. Given the papers title I would be much more cautious in offering these interpretations of Figure 4.**

Yes, the decline is transient, but the nature of the evolutionary behavior is what is shown to be consistent with some underlying theoretical principles. A similar analysis could be done for the 1930s, but with more caution since naturally short term fluctuations become more uncertain the further back in time one goes.

**p666 “From Eq. (8), GWP growth. . .” This paragraph needs much more hedging. If it were related solely to Eq. 8 it would be fine, but it is also offering an interpretation of past/observed events. Also, it slips into discussing GDP (undefined) which is something different.**

GDP is now changed to GWP since that was merely an oversight. The discussion is based only the statistics in Figure 4.

**p666 “Rather, they increase when new reserves of energy or matter are discov-**

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**ered and they decrease when there is is[delete] accelerated decay.”**

Changed

**p667 “Here,  $N_S$  represents the accumulated material size of civilization due to past production.  $\delta$  is a decay parameter that accounts for how rapidly  $N_S$  falls apart due to natural causes.” You need to be clearer what you mean by ‘size’. Is it a mass or some kind of dimension? Clearly this affects what decay means.**

The text is now rewritten to read

*Here,  $N_S$  represents the amount of matter or mass within civilization.  $N_S$  grows from a positive imbalance between civilization’s incorporation of raw materials from the environment and civilization’s material decay.*

**p667 “Building on the identity  $a = \lambda C$ , it was argued” By Garrett (2014)?**

Yes. The reference is added.

**p667 – 668 “In our case, our bodies are a complex network of nerves, veins, gastrointestinal tracts and pulmonary tubes. We use this network so that we can interact with a network of electrical circuits, communication lines, plumbing, roads, shipping lanes and aviation routes (van Dijk, 2012). Such networks have been built from a net accumulation of matter. So, as civilization grows, any given addition becomes increasingly incremental.” van Dijk 2012 only relates to social/information networks. You need to cite and discuss this section in the context of Jarvis et al (2015) (<http://www.earth-syst-dynam-discuss.net/6/133/2015/esdd-6-133-2015.html>). I’m slightly frustrated I have to point this out to you given you reviewed that work and were sent earlier versions of the same back in 2013.**

The paper referred to is still in review.

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**p668** “That economic growth has been sustained over the past 150 years is a testament to to[delete] the importance. . .”

**p668** “technological change = improved longevity+net reserve discovery +extraction efficiency gains”. The impression given here is that these fall naturally out of the analysis. However, I am left thinking that is because these are the things we think are important in this context and hence we fashion the analysis accordingly. This is fine, but needs to be made clear which.

No, fashioning the analysis that was would be a bad approach that runs counter to the intent of this work. Each term falls naturally out of the thermodynamics. Of course I tried to give the terms sensible sounding names that help to convey what the thermodynamics represents. But that’s no different than labelling something a force or a pressure.

**p668** “there would be no offset to new network growth.” **Why network growth? Networks are not an explicit consideration of this research.**

It comes from Part I where growth is expressed in terms of a length density. Nonetheless the work network is no replaced with material.

**p669** “increased longevity, corresponds with declining inflation and faster real GWP growth”. I think it is interesting to reflect on why therefore short-termism is so prevalent in many innovations. We argue it’s because the stock of society has to evolve at a certain rate.

I’m not sure I understand the relationship to short-termism within this context.

**p669** “It represents a technological advance because there is reduced competition for available resources.” **Why?**

The text is now added

*From 10, larger reserves enable higher rates of return on the relative growth of wealth*

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*and energy consumption.*

**p670** “An initial exponential growth phase yields to diminishing returns where growth rates stabilize (Fig. 5).” Again, long-run global primary energy use data suggest long-run relative growth rates are persistent (Jarvis and Hewitt, 2015) and there is no sign of it tailing off yet. This needs to be discussed here.

The physics and data support a picture of evolving growth rates for civilization, common with other organic systems like plants and animals, and inorganic systems like snow flakes. As described in the text, even historical examinations of past civilizations support a logistic growth curve (Marchetti and Ausubel, 2012), not one of fixed growth.

**p670** “This is in fact precisely the behaviour that has been observed in the past few decades.” See earlier discussion on long-run behaviour of global primary energy use in relation to Fig. 4.

See the associated response.

**p671** “the long-run evolution of the global economy.” Would prefer something broader/more thermodynamic than the ‘global economy’.

The phrase “and its resource consumption” has now been added.

**p671** “Figure 6 shows the relationship between innovation rates and rates of return over the past three centuries (see Part 1 for associated statistics).” Again, we need data sources including in the caption for Figure 6.

The data sources are Part I. They are published nowhere else. However, more explanation is now provided.

**p671** “For the period since 1950 where statistical reconstructions of GWP are yearly and presumably most reliable Maddison (2003), Fig. 6 shows that the past 60 years have been characterized by a least-squares fit relationship between innovation rates  $d\ln\tau/dt$  and rates of return (with 95% uncertainty bounds) given

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by...". Some reason for the observations not conforming to this behaviour pre 1950 needs to be given beyond 'the data are crap'.

To avoid confusion as to the intent here, the text now reads

*Focussing on the period since 1950 where statistical reconstructions of GWP are yearly and presumably most reliable.*

In the paragraph prior it is already acknowledged that the data point to periods of both rising and falling innovation. Given the sparsity of the data provided by Maddison prior to 1950, it simply did not seem warranted to make too much of the precise relationship between  $d \ln \eta / dt$  and  $\eta$ .

**p673 "Coal power production expanded steadily at a rate of about 2% per year. Oil reserves, on the other hand, expanded at an average 3.6% per year between 1950 and 1970 but shrunk at an average 0.7% per year between 1990 and 2010. The amount of energy required to access key raw materials such as cement, wood, copper and steel, dropped by an average 3.5% per year between 1950 and 1970 implying rapid efficiency gains. Since then, energy consumption and raw material consumption have grown at nearly equivalent rates." All these stats need citations.**

These statistics were calculated for this paper based on the statistical sources cited in Appendix (now) C. This is mentioned already in this section.

**p674 "As a consequence of being a constant, calculated rates of return are similar whether they are calculated from available energy statistics using Eq. (4) or from GWP statistics using Eq. (6)." I'd like to see this as I don't think this is true, or if it is it must depend on which data are used given my experience is very different.**

As mentioned, these statistics are described in Table 3.

**p674 "Civilization has seen waves of logistic or sigmoidal growth throughout**  
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**its history where an initial phase of exponential growth was followed by slower rates of expansion." If they are "waves" then the framework proposed here only describes what is happening within a wave and does not capture the wider long-run systemic features of the growth of civilisation.**

I'm not sure I understand the distinction.

**p679 "As a side note, since eta is also equal to the rate of growth in energy consumption (Eq. 4) [t]his yields. . ."**

## References

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- Marchetti, C. and Ausubel, J. H.: Quantitative Dynamics of Human Empires, *Int. J. Anth.*, 27, 1–62, 2012.
- Scher, I. and Koomey, J.: Is accurate forecasting of economic systems possible? An editorial comment, *Clim. Change*, 3, 473–479, 10.1007/s10584-010-9945-z, 2011.

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