

1 **Resource acquisition, distribution and end-use efficiencies and the**
2 **growth of industrial society**

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12 **Abstract**

13 **A key feature of the growth of industrial society is the acquisition of increasing**
14 **quantities of resources from the environment and their distribution for end-use. With**
15 **respect to energy, the growth of industrial society appears to have been near**
16 **exponential for the last 160 years. We provide evidence that indicates that the global**
17 **distribution of resources that underpins this growth may be facilitated by the**
18 **continual development and expansion of near optimal directed networks (roads,**
19 **railways, flight paths, pipelines, cables etc.). However, despite this continual striving**
20 **for optimisation, the distribution efficiencies of these networks must decline over time**
21 **as they expand due to path lengths becoming longer and more tortuous. Therefore, to**
22 **maintain long-term exponential growth the physical limits placed on the distribution**
23 **networks appear to be counteracted by innovations deployed elsewhere in the**
24 **system, namely at the points of acquisition and end-use of resources. We postulate**
25 **that the maintenance of the growth of industrial society, as measured by global**
26 **energy use, at the observed rate of $\sim 2.4 \text{ \%yr}^{-1}$, stems from an implicit desire to**
27 **optimise patterns of energy use over human working lifetimes.**

28 **Keywords**

29 Global, Energy, Networks, Growth.

30 **1. Introduction**

31 The growth of industrial society since the Industrial Revolution has required the continual
32 exploitation of a diverse range of environmentally-derived resources. Because resources are
33 seldom consumed at the point of extraction, this in turn has required the construction of
34 ever-expanding distribution networks. These networks can be seen to form part of a global
35 Resource Acquisition, Distribution and End-use (RADE) system linking environmental
36 resources with points of end-use. In many respects these man-made networks resemble
37 those seen in natural systems, both in terms of form and function. Here we attempt to apply
38 theoretical insights from research into the evolution of natural systems to the man-made
39 system that constitutes global industrial society, with a particular focus on energy.

40 This paper builds on a long tradition of attempting to understand socio-economic systems
41 through the application of insights from the natural sciences. Initially these insights were
42 largely metaphoric, but increasingly the application of evolutionary (Nelson and Wilson,
43 1982), metabolic (Fischer-Kowalski and Huttler, 1998) and thermodynamic (Garrett, 2011,
44 2012) theories has become much more direct in this area. The fundamental physical
45 constraints that underpin the development of distribution networks have previously been
46 used to try and explain the behaviour of biological systems (West et al., 1997), river basins
47 (Rodríguez-Iturbe and Rinaldo, 1997), electricity grids, water distribution systems, road
48 networks (Dalgaard and Strulik, 2011; Pauliuka et al., 2014; Bettencourt et al., 2007), and
49 even cities (Bettencourt, 2013), but have not previously been applied to the behaviour and
50 growth of global industrial society itself.

51 Here we explore the possibility that the growth of industrial society is in part regulated by the
52 behaviour of the distribution networks within a global RADE system. The resources moved

53 by man-made distribution networks include energy and the other materials from which
54 industrial society is constructed. In the following analysis we focus specifically on the energy
55 used in acquisition, distribution and end-use. We do this because the performance of RADE
56 networks is determined by their energy efficiency (i.e. the proportion of energy lost in
57 transporting mass across networks) and because energy use is one of the best observed
58 metrics of global economic activity. Furthermore, because all aspects of industrial society
59 use energy, and are themselves constructed using energy, a potentially self-reinforcing
60 feedback exists between energy use and the growth of industrial society.

61 Our analysis suggests that:

- 62 1) By definition, resource distribution networks must fill the space occupied by industrial
63 society. These networks appear to behave near optimally with respect to minimising
64 energy losses if the space being filled is three dimensional.
- 65 2) Whether optimal or not, the distribution efficiency of the global RADE system
66 declines over time, apparently due to the increasing distribution costs associated with
67 growth-induced network expansion;
- 68 3) This declining distribution efficiency appears to be offset by increasing acquisition
69 and end-use efficiencies. This is evidenced by the observed near constant relative
70 growth rate in energy use that maintained at the global scale despite declining
71 distribution efficiencies.
- 72 4) The maintenance of growth in energy use at the global scale, specifically at the
73 observed long-term average of $\sim 2.4\% \text{ yr}^{-1}$, may be explained by the minimisation of
74 energy losses over a timescale characteristic of human working lifetimes.

75 The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the distribution network theory that
76 underpins the work. This is then used in Section 3 to specify and test a predicted scaling

77 relationship between energy flows at the point of acquisition (global primary energy) and
78 those arriving at the points of end-use (global final energy). Section 4 is a discussion on the
79 geometry of the space being filled by the RADE system. Section 5 extends the analysis to
80 consider behaviour at the country scale and how this aggregates to give the observed global
81 scale behaviour. Section 6 then explores how the observed global trends (at least with
82 respect to primary energy) may extend back to at least 1850. In so doing we focus in on one
83 of the specific mechanisms that appears to mediate the evolution of the RADE system,
84 namely the dematerialisation of resource flows. Section 7 offers a simple model of the full
85 RADE system that accounts for the exponential growth in global energy use observed. This
86 model yields constant relative growth in energy use despite the decreasing returns to scale
87 associated with the expansion of the RADE distribution network(s). Section 8 uses this
88 simple model to attempt to account for the specific observed long term relative growth rate in
89 global primary energy use of $\sim 2.4\% \text{ yr}^{-1}$. This is done by exploring an optimisation of
90 average personal energy use over specific integration timescales. Finally, Section 9 offers
91 some concluding remarks concerning the growth of industrial society in general and some
92 thoughts on further work.

93 **2. Energy and resource distribution networks**

94 Resource distribution networks are ubiquitous in nature. Specifically, in biology these
95 networks, such as cardio-vascular systems in mammals and vascular systems in higher
96 plants, distribute resources from points of acquisition to the end-use tissues and cells which
97 require these resources to function. Because this form of spatial distribution must itself
98 consume a significant proportion of the acquired energy resources, this has provided strong
99 selective pressure for the evolution of optimal forms of network architecture and operation,
100 with branched directed networks becoming ubiquitous in nature (Savage et al., 2004).
101 Furthermore, biological systems are frequently comprised of complex networks of networks.
102 These networks often co-evolve together as parts of an overall system that both collects and
103 distributes resources, e.g. lungs, blood, lymph, and nerves in animals. This means that the

104 networks can be configured both many-to-one (i.e. points of acquisition to collection point)
105 and one-to-many (i.e. distribution point to points of end-use) within the same organism.
106 Interestingly, these integrated systems still appear to follow the same theoretical laws, and
107 thus exhibit the same scaling behaviour, as single directed networks (Savage et al., 2004).

108 We believe it is self-evident that the growth of industrial society has also required the
109 construction of ever-expanding resource distribution networks. These networks include a
110 wide range of infrastructures such as pipes, cables, footpaths, roads, railways, shipping
111 lanes and flight paths. The resources being distributed through these networks are also
112 diverse, including energy, raw materials, manufactured goods, waste, people etc. Here we
113 focus largely on flows of energy. These flows originate from the acquisition of
114 environmentally derived resources which pass through distribution networks to points of end-
115 use. These terminal points of the networks can be thought of as units of energy consumption
116 distributed in the space occupied by industrial society. Taken as a whole, we view this entire
117 process as a Resource Acquisition, Distribution and End-use (RADE) system.

118 RADE networks are optimised by minimising energy distribution losses whilst facilitating
119 resource use (West et al., 1997; Banavar et al., 2010). For energy flows we can define the
120 distribution efficiency of such networks by the ratio of the energy entering the network
121 (primary energy, x) to that arriving at the points of end-use (final energy, x^*). Networks can
122 be thought of as optimal if, under the constraint of having to satisfy particular end-use
123 demand, the distribution losses, $x - x^*$, are minimised for any given x and hence the
124 distribution efficiency can be defined as x^*/x . Maximisation of this distribution efficiency
125 (x^*/x) can be achieved by both minimising total path lengths and maximising unit path
126 length efficiencies.

127 One of the most effective means of minimising path lengths is to optimise the structure of the
128 system by co-locating points of end-use at optimal locations within RADE networks. Such
129 behaviour is ubiquitous in industrial society expressed through the process of urbanisation.

130 As for unit path length efficiencies, these can be affected by the method of distribution and
131 the nature of the resource being distributed. Two examples are the increasing use of more
132 fuel efficient vehicles and the liquefaction of natural gas for transportation. It is also important
133 to appreciate that path lengths and their efficiencies are not only determined by
134 infrastructural modes of distribution and the geographies of points of end-use but also by
135 decisions that people make when choosing between the pathways available to them. For
136 example, there may be many routes between two locations, but quicker and less arduous
137 routes are generally preferred.

138 In summary, our conceptual model of the distribution element of the global RADE system is
139 one of a space-filling network linking points of environmental resource acquisition to points of
140 societal end-use. To explore the possibility that the distribution element of the global RADE
141 system behaves in this way we now investigate the relationship between global primary
142 energy use, x , and global final energy use, x^* . We refrain from looking at the architectures of
143 specific networks because, as stated previously, our analysis is largely dependent on flows
144 of energy at the global scale. As such, we believe it is the emergent behaviour of the
145 network of networks that comprise the global RADE system that is relevant. This suggests
146 that the behaviour of individual network elements must be considered within the context of
147 the other network elements they operate alongside.

148 **3. Primary and final energy flows at the global scale**

149 As discussed previously, one definition of an optimal network is where distributional energy
150 losses are minimised. West et al. (1997) employed an optimal model of a fractal space-filling
151 network to demonstrate how distribution networks in nature can give rise to observed scaling
152 patterns. Banavaar et al. (2010) showed that these patterns were not restricted to fractal
153 networks. Although not articulated in these papers, both of these analyses elude to a
154 theoretical upper limit of the distribution efficiency x^*/x for any given space being occupied
155 by a distribution network. If L is the linear size of the network then the size of the space
156 being filled by the network is given by L^D where D is the dimension of the space being filled

157 by the network. Independent of the specific modelling assumptions considered by either
158 West or Banavaar, to be consistent with their modelling results, optimal network efficiency
159 has to scale with network size according to $x^*/x \propto L^{-D/(D+1)}$. This even holds as L tends to
160 zero because D must also tend to zero in the limit, so the efficiency of the network has a
161 theoretical unity upper limit even as $L \rightarrow 0$.

162 The scaling relationship between x^*/x and L suggests that the relationship between the
163 energy arriving at the points of final use, x^* , and the primary energy flow entering the
164 network, x , should scale as $x^* \propto x^{D/(D+1)}$. This is the same scaling relationship proposed by
165 Dalgaard and Strulik (2011), building on Banavar et al. (2010), when attempting to account
166 for the energy distribution losses in the US electricity grid. The reason for sub-unity scaling
167 between x^* and x is simply because as the size of the system increases so does its average
168 path length between points of acquisition and end-use, L . This increase in path length
169 causes the distribution efficiency, x^*/x , to fall. However, rather than the efficiency falling in
170 proportion to increases in network size, L^D , it falls in proportion to $L^{D/(D+1)}$, i.e. at a rate
171 slower than one would predict from geometric considerations alone. This is because of the
172 optimisation of the distribution links within the RADE network as discussed earlier.

173 We define global primary energy use, x , as the annual energy flow from nature to society in
174 the form of wood, coal, oil, gas, nuclear, renewables and food. Primary energy is generally
175 treated as the combustible energy equivalent of these sources. This does introduce some
176 complexity when handling non-combustible sources (e.g. wood used for construction), but
177 given these are such a small fraction of the total this is not believed to significantly affect the
178 quality of the aggregate global primary energy data (Macknick, 2009). Total food use was
179 estimated by assuming global per capita consumption of $3 \times 10^9 \text{ J yr}^{-1}$ (United Nations,
180 2002), although presently this represents less than 1% of the total.

181 We define x^* (final energy use) as the energy available to industrial society once distribution
182 losses have been accounted for. The International Energy Agency (IEA) provides estimates

183 of energy lost through its acquisition, processing and delivery to end users. However, these
184 data do not account for energy losses associated with either the acquisition of non-energy
185 resources and agriculture or the transport of all mass through industrial society. In an effort
186 to account for these losses to obtain x^* we have subtracted the IEA estimates of energy
187 used in quarrying, mining, agriculture, forestry and, in particular, transport, from the IEA final
188 energy consumption data.

189 Considering transport as a distributional loss raises an important conceptual issue. Currently
190 approximately 50 percent of transport energy use is associated with passenger movements.
191 Traditionally these are seen as end-use energy services enjoyed by people. However, here
192 we treat them as necessary distributional losses required to get energy consumers to spatial
193 nodes where they can contribute to the continued growth of the RADE system. In other
194 words, we view the flow of people like the flow of any other mass in the RADE system.
195 Hence we view nodes of final consumption as static locations where final energy is
196 consumed, albeit with human agency applied to the purpose of consumption. Importantly,
197 this means that nodes are best viewed as more than just passive recipients of resource.
198 Instead final consumption nodes must in turn facilitate the further acquisition of resources
199 through extending the interface between industrial society and the environment (Garrett,
200 2011, 2012). Taking this approach essentially means that all components of the RADE
201 system that are mobile are distributional and all static components are either acquiring
202 resources or consuming resources for end-use. Although this framing may be contrary to
203 more traditional views of humans as 'energy consumers' we believe it is at least internally
204 consistent with our view of the RADE system and the role of humans in it.

205 It should be noted that our estimates of x^* do not adequately account for the distribution
206 energy losses occurring between the point of sale and the point of end-use of energy (e.g. in
207 the case of electricity, losses occurring between the meter and the plug). However, we
208 assume these to be relatively small relative to all upstream losses associated with acquiring
209 and distributing all resources. The small underestimate of distributional loss implied by our

210 estimate of final energy using the IEA data should be partially offset by the fact that our
211 revision of the IEA final energy use will also include some non-distributional energy uses
212 (e.g. end-use energy in agriculture) due to the way the IEA data are compiled.

213 We define the space associated with unit final energy consumption (referred to as a “control
214 volume” by Dalgaard and Strulik, 2011) as being that where the consumption of useful
215 energy in that space is significantly greater than the transfer of useful energy from that space
216 to other regions of the network. These spaces are complex entities and not easy to identify,
217 because in a global mean sense they are comprised of broad portfolios of energy uses. That
218 said, examples of end-use processes might include reading this article on a computer,
219 cooking, constructing or demolishing a residential building etc.

220 As for energy losses due to energy transformations that occur between primary and final
221 energy, these are far more significant. One way of reconciling these transformations within
222 the current framework is that they are deployed to reduce mass flows in critical parts of the
223 system (e.g. by generating electricity from coal). Here the substantial energy losses incurred
224 by these transformations are presumably offset by the downstream savings they facilitate (in
225 this example, by reducing the amount of coal distributed to individual households). This point
226 will be explored in greater detail in Section 4.

227 Figure 1a shows the relationship between x and x^* for the available IEA data. We find that
228 $x^* \propto x^c$ ($c = 0.75 \pm 0.02$)ⁱ, i.e. the scaling exponent c is statistically indistinguishable from
229 three quarters. For reference, using the IEA definition of final energy gives $c = 0.84 \pm 0.01$
230 with practically all of the difference between these two estimates attributable to the inclusion
231 of transport in our specification of final energy. Figure 1b shows the equivalent relationship
232 between the distribution efficiency, x^*/x , and primary energy, x . It confirms that, as

ⁱ Scaling exponents have been estimated using ordinary least squares of the linear model $\ln(x^*) = \theta_1 \ln(x) + \theta_2$. Parameter uncertainties are reported at 95% confidence. 1σ uncertainties in the data were assumed to be 5 percent (Macknick, 2009). All results were also cross-checked using nonlinear least squares of the untransformed data.

233 predicted, the overall efficiency of the network has progressively fallen over time as x has
234 increased and is now below 50 percent, i.e. more than half of all primary energy is now used
235 simply to move all the materials and resources required by industrial society (e.g.
236 environmentally-derived materials, mobile system infrastructure and people) to final nodes of
237 end-use.

238 **4. What space does society inhabit?**

239 The fact that we observe scaling between x^* and x that is statistically indistinguishable from
240 three quarters suggests $D = 3$ in the framework set out above. Although the relative
241 dimensions are far from equal, it is self-evident that the networks moving mass through
242 global industrial society occupy a three dimensional space. However, since the horizontal
243 dimensions of this space are approximately three orders of magnitude greater than the
244 vertical dimension (delineated by, for example, the distance between the deepest mines and
245 the height at which aircraft fly), it is appropriate to ask whether this space is more
246 appropriately approximated by a two dimensional surface rather than a three dimensional
247 volume. This question cannot be answered conclusively here but we offer the following lines
248 of evidence to suggest that $D = 3$ does indeed provide a plausible description of the space
249 filled by the global RADE system.

250 Firstly, the effect of gravity obviously imposes disproportionately higher distribution costs on
251 movement in the vertical dimension than in the horizontal. We conjecture that these
252 differences in cost are between one and two orders of magnitude. This could rise
253 significantly above three orders of magnitude when the engineering difficulties of exploring
254 the vertical dimension below ground are considered. Whether this is sufficient to result in D
255 = 3 in the global RADE networks is unclear although we note we invariably treat the
256 atmosphere as a three dimensional object even though it too has a severely diminished
257 vertical dimension. Secondly, the scaling behaviour of urban centres suggests that people
258 occupy a three dimensional space at the city scale, despite the fact that the vertical
259 dimension is again very much attenuated (Nordbeck, 1971). Even silicone chips, which

260 have a trivial vertical dimension, exhibit scaling of the order of $D = 2.5$ (Deng and Maly,
261 2004) suggesting that even a highly attenuated vertical dimension with no disproportional
262 losses can result in non-trivial scaling effects. Finally, although the Earth's surface can, by
263 definition, be considered a two dimensional object, the curvature of this surface at the global
264 scale may be sufficient to introduce third dimensional effects in the links between network
265 nodes.

266 An alternative explanation to our observed scaling behaviour of the global energy system is
267 that $D < 3$ and that the system operates supra-optimally, which appears infeasible. Equally,
268 the observed exponent of three quarters may have arisen by chance and the systemic
269 explanation explored here is incorrect. This proposition cannot be rejected, but then neither
270 can the proposition that $D = 3$. It also seems somewhat anomalous that we would observe a
271 scaling exponent that is indistinguishable from three quarters if the system was two
272 dimensional.

273 If the global RADE network has the dimensions of $D = 3$, then the scaling observed between
274 x and x^* suggests that, at the global scale, the distribution networks that underpin the RADE
275 system are, in aggregate, optimised with respect to energy losses, despite filling a highly
276 irregular three dimensional space. That the RADE networks created within industrial society
277 should be near-optimal does not seem unreasonable given the pressures to seek out
278 performance improvements in a competitive global market system.

279 As a result of the framework set out above we identify three related mechanisms through
280 which distribution efficiency gains, and hence the optimisation of this element of the global
281 RADE system, could be realised.

282 1) The efficiency of network infrastructure is progressively improved over time (e.g. by
283 the use of more aerodynamic vehicles, more efficient combustion processes etc.).

284 2) The flows are themselves persistently dematerialised over time (e.g. by introduction
285 of lighter vehicles, shifting the primary fuel mix from wood to coal to oil to gas or
286 turning coal into electricity – see later – etc.).

287 3) The structure of and practices on the network are modified over time to reduced
288 average path lengths, L (e.g. by building a new road, introducing car navigation
289 systems, by the reorganisation of the points of acquisition and end-use during
290 urbanisation etc.).

291 The first two of these are primarily concerned with maximising unit path length efficiencies,
292 whilst the third is primarily concerned with minimising total path lengths. It may also be that
293 processes like urbanisation offer additional benefits in that the increased social interactions
294 that result from the clustering of people stimulate the innovations required to discover and
295 realise the three efficiency mechanisms mentioned above (Bettencourt, 2012). These
296 innovations have to be continuously discovered, developed and implemented in order to
297 accommodate the growth of the RADE system. We shall return to the subject of resource
298 flow dematerialisation in more detail in Section 6.

299 **5. What happens at the regional scale?**

300 Thus far our analysis has been focussed at the global scale, yet this global behaviour must
301 emerge from regional scale dynamics. Each region, i , uses primary energy, x_i , and final
302 energy, x_i^* , where $\sum x_i = x$ and $\sum x_i^* = x^*$. As we have already discussed, networks tend to
303 become less efficient as they expand due to the size-related penalties of growth. It appears
304 that this behaviour is observed at the global scale with x^*/x decreasing as x increases
305 (Figure 1b). In the absence of further innovation and all else remaining equal, we would
306 anticipate the same behaviour at the regional scale. This means that in portions of the
307 system with higher energy use densities (i.e. higher energy use per unit space) we would
308 expect lower regional distribution network efficiencies, x_i^*/x_i . Conversely, in portions of the
309 system with lower energy use densities (i.e. lower energy use per unit space) we would

310 anticipate higher regional distribution network efficiencies. However, if this divergence in
311 distribution efficiencies between regions, due to differing energy use densities, actually arose
312 at any given point in time it would presumably cause the global system to be sub-optimal
313 because global final energy use could be increased for the same global primary energy use
314 simply by shifting resource distribution from the less efficient to the more efficient portions of
315 the system.

316 This sub-optimality is not what we observe at the global scale. Instead, as discussed above,
317 the observed approximate three quarter scaling between x and x^* indicates that the global
318 RADE system is operating near-optimally with respect to distribution if $D = 3$. Because the
319 system appears it could be near-optimal at the global scale, we would expect distribution
320 efficiency gains to be persistently sought out. In other words, if optimal, the RADE system
321 would evolve such that it seeks to exhaust all potential improvements with respect to energy
322 use. As a result, we hypothesise that, at any particular point in time, all countries of the world
323 should have similar network efficiencies and these should be independent of their energy
324 use densities (i.e. their x_i per unit space). In order to achieve this, countries located in more
325 energy dense (i.e. more developed) portions of the system presumably innovate more
326 aggressively on distribution efficiency to overcome the size-related penalties of growth than
327 do those in less energy dense (i.e. less developed) portions of the system. Once again,
328 examples of these innovations might be the enhanced efficiency of mass transport,
329 enhanced urbanisation and the enhanced use of gas or electricity.

330 We test this hypothesis using IEA data for 140 countries for the period 1971 – 2010. Figure 2
331 shows the relationship between primary and final energy use (x_i and x_i^*) for these data. In
332 the absence of a measure of the effective volume being filled by society, we have
333 normalised energy use by country land area in order to attempt to reflect the space-filling
334 aspect of the system. Because this assumes uniform average vertical dimensions between
335 countries and is applied to both x_i and x_i^* this only changes the relative positions of
336 countries, not their individual efficiencies.

337 As predicted, Figure 2 shows that at any given point in time x_i^*/x_i is largely independent of x_i
338 ($x_i^* \propto x_i^c$; $c = 0.97 \pm 0.03$ for all 40 years). This appears to hold across all 140 countries
339 sampled, which have a range of 10^5 in energy use per unit area. For example, currently the
340 UK has a similar distribution efficiency, x^*/x , to that of Bolivia (0.473 vs. 0.466), despite
341 having $>10^2$ greater energy use density. A significant contributor to the variation in x_i^* and x_i
342 is probably the less reliable IEA energy data for less-developed countries. We note that the
343 variation created by these uncertainties is not systematically above or below the central
344 trend. Moreover, we would expect the relationship to be even clearer if we were able to
345 normalise the data by the appropriate volume, rather than area, occupied by society in each
346 country.

347 Because of the apparent invariance of distribution network efficiency with energy use density
348 it would appear that regional networks are not scaled versions of the global system, i.e. the
349 global RADE network appears to be scale dependent rather than scale free. This implies that
350 you cannot simply look at isolated sub-components of the global RADE network (e.g.
351 individual countries) in order to infer the behaviour of the global system.

352 **6. Long-run growth and decarbonisation of global energy use**

353 Thus far we have focussed on data on primary and final energy use covering the last 40
354 years. However, there are data on primary energy use going back much further than this. As
355 mentioned earlier, global primary energy use, x , is taken here to be the annual energy flow
356 from the environment to society in the form of wood, coal, oil, gas, nuclear, renewables and
357 food. In order to construct a consistent time series for x since 1850, following Jarvis et al.
358 (2012), the global primary energy use data for the period 1850 to 1964 are taken from
359 Grubler (2003) and for the period from 1965 to 2010 from BP (2011). We note that compiling
360 long-term historic series for virtually any relevant measure of economic activity is challenging
361 due to the paucity of available data and increasing uncertainties the further back one goes.
362 Data on energy use is not exempt from these limitations. For example, the Grubler data we
363 use do not appear to capture the full portfolio of renewables in use in the 1800s (e.g. wind

364 and water power). However, we also note that the energy data used here still represents one
365 of the best observed metrics of global economic activity. Also on the specific issue of
366 renewables post-1850, evidence suggests that they constituted a negligible part of the global
367 energy portfolio during this period (O'Connor and Cleveland, 2014, and Fouquet, 2014).

368 We opt to use the BP data in order to attempt to have some limited independence from the
369 IEA data used to explore the relationship between x and x^* . To produce a homogenous
370 record for 1850 to 2010 the mean difference between the two series for the period 1965 to
371 1995 (which is largely due to lack of wood fuel use in the BP dataset) was added to the BP
372 data. The data were converted from tonnes of oil equivalent (toe) to Joules, assuming 10^{18} J
373 $= 2.38 \times 10^7 \text{ toe}$ (Sims et al., 2007).

374 Figure 3 shows the primary energy use data, x , for the period 1850-2010. These suggest
375 that, in the long term, x has grown near exponentially since at least 1850, with a long term
376 relative growth rate of $2.4 (\pm 0.08) \% \text{ yr}^{-1}$ (Jarvis et al. 2012)ⁱⁱ. Using global Gross Domestic
377 Product (GDP) data as a proxy for global energy use, Garrett (2014) suggests that the
378 relative growth rate of global primary energy has increased significantly over this period. The
379 data and analysis in Figure 3 would indicate otherwise, although clearly there are significant
380 uncertainties over actual global primary energy measures both now and more significantly
381 pre-1900. For example it is unclear what contribution wind makes through shipping over this
382 period. That said, that the long-run growth in primary energy use observed over the last 40
383 years actually appears to extend back at least 160 years suggests that the processes and
384 trends that have underpinned the development of the global RADE system may have
385 actually been operating for considerably longer than the IEA data provide evidence for. If this

ⁱⁱ Relative growth rates have been estimated using ordinary least squares of the general linear model $\ln(x) = \theta(t - t_1)$. Parameter uncertainties are reported at 95% confidence. The model residuals, which were significantly autocorrelated, have been de-correlated assuming a first-order autoregressive noise model to minimize any bias in the estimates of θ . 1σ uncertainties in the data were assumed to be 5 percent in energy use and fossils fuel emissions (Macknick, 2009); and 20 percent in land-based emissions (Le Quere, pers comms).

386 is the case we would predict that the optimisation mechanisms identified earlier would also
387 have been at work over the same period. In particular, we would expect that these
388 optimisation mechanisms would be sought out and implemented at a rate that matches the
389 growth-induced declines in distribution efficiency experienced by the global RADE system
390 revealed in Figure 1b.

391 To explore this proposition we focus on the dematerialisation of resource flows. The primary
392 energy carrier for industrial society is carbon, and in fact some estimates suggest that
393 carbon currently accounts for as much as 50 percent of the total amount of materials moved
394 by industrial society through its RADE networks (Dittrich and Bringezu, 2010). This material
395 flow ultimately leads to the emissions of carbon dioxide as carbon-based energy carriers are
396 consumed. Hence the emission rates of carbon dioxide can be seen as giving a measure of
397 the flow of carbon-based energy carriers through the RADE system. In the context of the
398 distribution costs of resources, decarbonisation can therefore be viewed as merely one,
399 albeit important, component of a general systemic dematerialisation of resource flows
400 (Ausubel, 1989) through the RADE system . Here dematerialisation is taken as the removal
401 of 'unnecessary' mass from resource flows through innovation. This systemic
402 dematerialisation is almost certainly not unique to carbon and may indeed be a necessary
403 response to the increasing distribution costs inherent in any expanding network.

404 To estimate the amount of carbon flowing through the RADE system we use global carbon
405 emissions data from Houghten (2010), Boden et al. (2010) and Peters et al. (2012)ⁱⁱⁱ. Figure

ⁱⁱⁱ As in Jarvis et al (2012), we have included land use change in the measurement of carbon emissions because our definition of x necessarily includes wood use. However, although deforestation dominates the land use change emissions estimates, not all deforestation emissions are associated directly with the production and distribution of wood as a fuel, as they include significant contributions from slash-and-burn land clearance activities for food production. Furthermore, carbon neutral biomass production is not accommodated by net anthropogenic CO₂ emissions inventories. Between 1850 and 1900 wood fuel use constituted a significant proportion of global primary energy use (Grubler, 2008) but beyond 1900 their contribution to global carbon use quickly become dominated by fossil fuels.

406 3 shows that global carbon emissions, y , have also grown near-exponentially since at least
 407 1850 at the long-term rate of $1.8 (\pm 0.06)\% \text{ yr}^{-1}$ (Jarvis et al. 2012). The difference between
 408 this growth rate and the growth rate of primary energy indicates that the global primary
 409 energy portfolio has been systematically decarbonised at a rate of $\sim 0.6\% \text{ yr}^{-1}$ since at least
 410 1850 (Jarvis et al., 2012). This decarbonisation is normally viewed as being the result of
 411 societal preferences for cleaner, more convenient, energy carriers (Grübler and Nakienovic,
 412 1996). It has also been partially attributed to improvements in the efficiency of converting
 413 solid, liquid and gaseous fuels to electricity (Nakienovic, 1993). Both these explanations
 414 seem unsatisfactory given the constant long-run nature of the decline in carbon intensity.
 415 Furthermore, conversion efficiency affects the distribution efficiency, x^*/x , and hence x^* . It
 416 does not directly affect the primary portfolio comprising x . Instead, it is more appropriate to
 417 consider innovations on energy transformations as co-evolving with the portfolio of global
 418 primary energy. More specifically, it appears to us that the pattern of decarbonisation of the
 419 global energy portfolio is in line with, and a necessary response to, the declining distribution
 420 efficiency of the global RADE network, x^*/x .

421 The long-term exponential growth in both x and y set out above suggests that global primary
 422 energy use and carbon flows share a common exponential scaling relationship, $y \propto x^{b/a}$,
 423 where a and b are the relative growth rates of x and y respectively. Figure 1c shows the
 424 scaling relationship between x and y since 1850. From these data we see that the
 425 exponential scaling between x and y is not only a property of the 160 year average
 426 behaviour, but also holds remarkably well on intervening timescales. This relationship has a
 427 scaling exponent of $b/a = 0.76 (\pm 0.05)$. Calculating this exponent using the long-term (160
 428 year) exponents for x and y gives $b/a = 0.75 (\pm 0.06)$. As with the primary to final scaling
 429 identified earlier, this too is statistically indistinguishable from three quarters.

430 The scaling observed between x^* and x and between y and x therefore leads to direct
 431 proportionality between carbon intensity and network distribution efficiency ($y/x \propto x^f x^*/x$, c
 432 $= -0.006 \pm 0.043$, hence $x^f \approx 1$; see Figure 2c & d). As predicted then, the implementation of

433 dematerialisation appears to occur at a rate that is proportional to the growth-induced
434 declines in distribution efficiency experienced by the global RADE system. This would
435 appear to further corroborate our view of the role of the distribution networks that make up
436 the global RADE system. Interestingly, the result of the scaling between x , x^* and y also
437 indicates that total global anthropogenic CO₂ emissions grow in proportion to the
438 consumption of final energy, x^* , not primary energy, x .

439 To place our interpretation of the role of decarbonisation of the primary fuel mix in context,
440 the historic trend in primary energy use from wood to coal to oil to gas and renewables has
441 occurred because it has allowed less mass to be transported through the RADE network per
442 unit of energy used (Ausubel, 1989). Fundamentally this represents an innovation on the
443 distribution efficiency, x^*/x .

444 The recent shift towards the use of gas globally (ExxonMobil, 2013) represents a particularly
445 interesting continuation of this trend. Gas has a lower unit volume energy density than other
446 fossil fuel sources (i.e. coal or oil). Lower energy density carriers like gas suffer from higher
447 long distance transportation costs, which is presumably why a smaller proportion of gas is
448 traded internationally than oil or coal (ExxonMobil, 2013). However, gas also incurs lower
449 energetic costs when being distributed through the more tortuous finer terminal parts of the
450 distribution network (Banavar et al. 2010).

451 To illustrate this point it is useful to consider the paths that make up the global distribution
452 network as passing through three stages: the gathering together of resources from their
453 extraction points in the environment; the intermediate transportation of resources from
454 regions of extraction to regions of end-use; and lastly the distribution of resources to the
455 nodes of final end-use (see Figure 4). As the global distribution network develops, the
456 relative importance of these three network elements in controlling overall distribution costs
457 should change. This is because, although the long distance intermediate costs increase as
458 the network expands, the final distribution costs increase faster (Banavar et al., 2010). This

459 concept is already well established in transportation and telecommunications networks as
460 'the last mile problem'. So as the RADE system as a whole grows, low carbon energy
461 carriers such as gas are increasingly preferred, and this preference is most keenly felt in the
462 final distribution elements of the RADE system. This seems intuitive when one imagines the
463 vastly increased distributional costs that an advanced (i.e. energy dense) country like
464 Germany would incur if it tried to meet its energy demands for heating and cooking solely
465 through distributing coal to individual end users, instead of by the increasing use of gas.

466 This demand for low-carbon energy carriers in the terminal parts of the RADE system may
467 also stimulate innovations such as the liquefaction of natural gas (LNG) because LNG
468 reduces the costs of moving gas long distances during intermediate transportation. Similarly,
469 innovations in hydraulic fracturing can allow exploitation of gas resources near to the final
470 point of use, removing some of the need for long distance transport. Lastly, electrification is
471 currently the primary means of dematerialising energy flows through transformation and, just
472 as with gas, the lower energetic costs of transmitting electricity are most effectively deployed
473 in the final distribution parts of the network, e.g. in developed, urbanised areas. This would
474 explain why decarbonisation is sometimes associated with energy transformation efficiencies
475 given that both would co-evolve as distribution networks expand. However, we would argue
476 it is misleading to implicate conversion efficiency as a driver for the decarbonisation of
477 energy portfolios. It is interesting to note from Figure 3 that the recent increase in global coal
478 use, which tends to counter the long term trend of decarbonisation, has been largely offset at
479 the global scale by the increased use of gas, renewables and decreases in land-based
480 emissions. Furthermore, the vast majority of this coal is not distributed to final points of end-
481 use as it was a century ago. Instead it is used to generate electricity which is then distributed
482 to end users, which is consistent with the process of dematerialisation discussed above.

483 **7. Total energy efficiency and growth – a model**

484 If industrial society does indeed experience declining network distribution efficiency, as
485 indicated by Figure 2b, then, all else remaining equal, global industrial society should

486 experience size-related limits to growth in x , just as growth is self-limiting in most biological
487 systems (West et al., 2001). It is possible that the observed long-term exponential growth in
488 x could reflect the early stages of what is otherwise logistic size-restricted growth. If this is
489 the case then ultimately the growth of the global RADE system would be self-limiting, even
490 though primary energy use has risen exponentially and by ~50 fold since 1850. This in and
491 of itself is a fascinating prospect.

492 However, we argue that global industrial society is continually innovating to overcome the
493 increasing size-related penalties associated with growth. This seems consistent with the
494 apparent growth imperative of industrial society and the fact that the observed declines in
495 distribution efficiency shown in Figure 1b have been countered in order to maintain the near
496 constant relative growth rate of $\sim 2.4\% \text{ yr}^{-1}$ shown in Figure 3. We illustrate this point with the
497 following simple endogenous growth model in which we treat global industrial society as a
498 homogenous unit.

499 As global society grows, it acquires additional primary energy flows to support additional end
500 uses, the two being linked by extensions to existing networks. Therefore, we can
501 conceptualise the growth of industrial society both as its expansion into new environmental
502 resources, and hence space, and the establishment of new points of end-use. Although the
503 space occupied by industrial society is complex, if $D = 3$, then it is appropriate to consider
504 society as occupying an (irregular) volume, V . If the end-use control volumes are considered
505 as being within V then, from a network perspective, it is also reasonable to assume the in-
506 use environmental resources are also within V , i.e. industrial society grows into its
507 resources (Garrett, 2011). If so, then we assume in the simplest case that the flow of
508 resource into industrial society is proportional to the volume of resources subsumed and

509 hence V^{iv} . Therefore, in the absence of any storage, the supply and consumption of primary
510 energy resources might simply be described by

$$511 \quad x = k_A V \quad (1)$$

512 where the proportionality k_A is the resource acquisition efficiency and is the product of the
513 energy potential between the environmentally-derived energy resources and society and the
514 efficiency with which these resources can be assimilated into the RADE system and hence
515 into industrial society.

516 Assuming networks distribute captured resources optimally within the volume, V , then the
517 final energy flow arriving at points of end-use, x^* , is given by

$$518 \quad x^* = gx^{D/(D+1)} \quad (2)$$

519 where g is a scaling constant (Dalgaard and Strulik, 2011). Once at the points of end-use,
520 and after subtracting the end-use inefficiencies (i.e. the costs of transforming final energy
521 into useful work), the remaining portion of x^* provides work which is used to increase the
522 size of industrial society (Garrett, 2011, 2012). This in turn expands V and allows the co-
523 option of further resources. Because it requires work to expand V , the size of industrial
524 society can also be viewed as the accumulation of this work, X , occupying the space, V .
525 The balance of this accumulated work can be seen as the difference between work done
526 and the decay of the stock of accumulated work,

$$527 \quad \frac{dX}{dt} = k_E x^* - k_D X \quad (3)$$

^{iv} We note that Garrett (2014) assumes environmental resources flow to industrial society across an environment-society interface (surface) and hence speculates that this flow is proportional to $V^{1/3}$ on theoretical grounds.

528 where k_E is the end-use efficiency of final energy conversion to useful work and k_D is the
529 aggregate decay rate of X .

530 Equations (1, 2 and 3) are exponential in x , in line with the observations in Figure 3, if $X \propto V$,
531 i.e. work operates uniformly in space. Because the mean energy density of industrial society
532 is unknown we assume $X = V$ for simplicity given this has no bearing on our analysis.

533 Equations (1, 2 & 3) now give

$$534 \quad \frac{dx}{dt} = (k_A k_E g x^{-1/4} - k_D)x = ax \quad (4)$$

535 where a is the relative growth rate of global primary energy, or $\sim 2.4\% \text{ yr}^{-1}$. From equation (4)
536 we see that $a \propto x^{-1/4}$ (West et al., 2001), i.e. as the system grows the relative growth rate
537 should fall. Therefore, in order to maintain exponential growth in x , the acquisition efficiency,
538 k_A , and/or the end-use efficiency, k_E , must be increased and/or the decay rate, k_D , must be
539 decreased to compensate for the declining capacity of primary energy to support growth.

540 We assume that both k_A and k_E are dynamically adjusted by society in order to maintain
541 growth, whilst k_D remains fixed. The assumption of a fixed decay rate is supported by the
542 observation that the mean lifetime of technologies (Grübler et al., 1999), including large
543 energy projects (Davis and Caldeira, 2010) has remained fairly constant at ~ 40 years, or
544 $(\sim 2.4\% \text{ yr}^{-1})^{-1}$, i.e. technologies decay at the same rate as the relative growth of industrial
545 society ($k_D = a$). One way of understanding such a link is that physical capital is turned over
546 at about the same rate as the system evolves, thereby allowing the appropriate rate of
547 adoption of the innovations required to preserve growth at the rate a .

548 In the absence of any change in the acquisition and end-use efficiencies, $a \propto x^{-1/4}$.

549 Therefore for a to remain constant requires

$$550 \quad k_A k_E = hx^{1/4} \quad (5)$$

551 where again h is a scaling constant. This now gives exponential growth in x as

552
$$\frac{dx}{dt} = (hg - k_D)x = ax \quad (6)$$

553 and $hg = 2a$ if $k_D = a$ as discussed above. Within this framework, if $k_D = a$, the energy that is
554 available to grow X and hence V, x_G , is given by

555
$$x_G = k_A^{-1}hgx = \varepsilon x \quad (7)$$

556 where ε is the overall primary to end-use energy efficiency of the RADE system (see also
557 Garrett, 2011). The observed near-constancy of the long-term relative growth rate in global
558 primary energy use strongly suggests that ε has remained more or less constant over at
559 least the last 160 years. Using IEA data, Nakicenovic et al. (1996) have estimated ε to be
560 ~30%, although this figure is highly uncertain because their analysis could not accurately
561 account for the end-use efficiency of final energy in productive work. Ayres (1989) attempted
562 a similar analysis for the US attempting to account for so called useful work (or exergy)
563 effects and derived an estimate of 2.5% for ε . In addition to the declining network distribution
564 efficiency x^*/x , Figure 1b also shows an illustration of the simultaneous increases in end-use
565 efficiencies, k_E , required to keep ε at a hypothetical value of 10%, assuming k_A is constant^v.
566 Figure 5 shows the model described above in block diagram form.

567 **8. Growth optimisation and working lifetimes**

568 Thus far we have sought to illustrate how the growth of industrial society, as determined by
569 its energy use, could be controlled by the optimisation of the RADE network. In part this
570 optimisation is facilitated by reducing material flows including decarbonisation of the primary
571 energy portfolio. We have also attempted to show that, despite this optimisation, RADE

^v Here 10 % is simply taken as an illustrative value for ε given its true value remains highly uncertain. This only affects the level of the relationship between x_G/x^* and x , not its scaling. Having assumed this value we can also specify a fixed value for k_A from equation (7) of $2a/0.1=0.5 \text{ yr}^{-1}$ for the case of $X = V$.

572 network efficiency necessarily falls. We have therefore set out how an observed near
573 constant relative growth rate is maintained through continuous but measured implementation
574 of innovations on both energy acquisition and end-use efficiencies. An important question
575 that remains is, if growth is desirable, why does industrial society only compensate for falling
576 distribution network efficiency, and not overcompensate to allow super-exponential growth?
577 Or, put another way, why is constant relative growth good? This cannot be due to the lack of
578 innovative capacity because there appears to be a surplus of this available to enhance
579 acquisition and end-use efficiencies in the global RADE system. This suggests that industrial
580 society is somehow self-regulated such that the relative growth rates of, for example, energy
581 use, are held near constant in the long run.

582 If there is a tendency in industrial society to implicitly regulate growth in things such as
583 energy use, insights into this could be obtained from considering the $\sim 2.4\% \text{ yr}^{-1}$ long-term
584 growth rate on which industrial society appears to settle. At this point, we note that a relative
585 growth rate of $a = 2.4\% \text{ yr}^{-1}$ corresponds to a growth timescale of $a^{-1} = 42$ years. It would
586 therefore appear sensible to attempt to understand growth in the context of this timescale.

587 To explore the possible relationships between a and the timescale a^{-1} we start by assuming
588 that the optimisation of the distribution component of the RADE network, combined with the
589 increasing acquisition and end-use efficiencies to control growth (as implied by the control in
590 equation 5), point to energy efficiency being an important systemic consideration. Energy
591 efficiency improvements of any kind amount to actions taken to reduce waste and hence
592 increase energy available for specific end uses. Although end-use is notoriously difficult to
593 specify, in the highly reduced description of the global energy system offered above, this
594 end-use can be summarised simply as the work done to expand the size of industrial
595 society. As a result, we refer to the energy not used directly in this work as ‘supportive’
596 energy use, x_s . i.e. energy supporting, but not directly used, in growth. System-wide optimal
597 energy efficiency improvements imply x_s is minimised in order to liberate as much energy for
598 growth as necessary. Examples of supportive energy might be the energy expended on

599 exploring, acquiring and distributing resources, personal transport, waste heat and light, etc.
 600 Examples of energy directly used for growth, x_G , would be energy used to construct, replace
 601 and repair the physical components of industrial society such as buildings, oil wells,
 602 pipelines, power stations, electricity grids, roads, railways etc.

603 We can express this supportive energy simply as

$$604 \quad x_s = x - x_G = (1 - \varepsilon)x \quad (8)$$

605 This definition of supportive energy may, at first, appear counter-intuitive because a
 606 significant proportion of x_s (such as personal transport) may be thought of as being useful to
 607 society. However, in the spatial context considered here, the components of x_s simply
 608 represent expenditures of energy necessary to facilitate the useful work of actually
 609 expanding the size of industrial society.

610 If industrial society does indeed attempt to minimise supportive energy use then we should
 611 be able to identify a value of a that minimises x_s over a given timescale, T . Noting equation
 612 (6) resolves to $x = e^{at}$, and combining within equation (8) gives

$$613 \quad X_s = a^{-1}(1 - \varepsilon)e^{aT} \quad (9)$$

614 where X_s is supportive energy accumulated over the integration timescale T . We can now
 615 differentiate equation (9) with respect to a to find the value of a that minimises X_s and, by
 616 implication, maximises growth over this timescale. Hence,

$$617 \quad \frac{dX_s}{da} = \frac{(1 - \varepsilon)Te^{aT}}{a} - \frac{(1 - \varepsilon)e^{aT}}{a^2} \quad (10)$$

618 which, for $dX_s/da = 0$, has a minimum in X_s at $T = a^{-1}$. Therefore, the growth rate of such a
 619 system is fundamentally linked to the timescale over which the system behaviour is
 620 optimised with respect to x_s .

621 Figure 6 shows the relationship between a and X_S predicted by equation (9). The minimum
622 in X_S with respect to a can be understood in that, for any given integration timescale T , if a
623 is below its optimum then the system experiences disproportionate short-term increases in
624 x_S and hence in X_S (equation 8). However, if a is above its optimum the system experiences
625 disproportionate long-term increases in X_S because of the effects of enhanced growth
626 (equation 6).

627 Having established a possible connection between the long run relative growth in global
628 primary energy use, $a \approx 2.4\% \text{ yr}^{-1}$, and the associated timescale, $a^{-1} = 42 \text{ yr}$, the question
629 remains, why does growth proceed on this timescale? As pointed out above, both
630 technologies in general (Grübler et al., 1999) and large power schemes in particular (Davis
631 and Caldeira, 2010) have average lifetimes of ~ 40 years. However, as also noted above,
632 these may simply be manifestations of the need to evolve the global energy portfolio in line
633 with its growth rate in order to allow for the required rate of uptake of innovations. Therefore,
634 we look to an alternative explanation of the underlying driver for growth organised at this ~ 40
635 year timescale.

636 Thus far, we have largely avoided discussing the role of the now seven billion agents
637 involved in making the decisions that lead to the observed emergent behaviour we have
638 attempted to describe above. We note that where observations are available, ~ 40 years is
639 the average working lifetime of people in industrial societies and that this has been a
640 relatively constant property of industrial societies (Ausbel and Grübler, 1995; Conover, 2011)
641 despite the very significant improvements in overall life expectancy in most countries. In
642 addition to the empirical observation that working lifetimes have been stable at around 40
643 years for a long time, the reason we might implicate working lifetimes as a possible factor on
644 which growth might be organised is that it is only during this timeframe that people can exert
645 influence over the decisions governing the evolution of industrial society. Prior to working, or
646 during retirement, although people are using resources, they are not directly able to
647 influence the evolution of the system. If during their working lifetimes the objective is to seek

648 out near optimal energy efficiency improvements and hence, by implication, to maximise
649 work done, then this should be sufficient to result in $\alpha \sim T^{-1} \sim 2.4\% \text{ yr}^{-1}$.

650 Figure 6 also shows that the objective function (equation 9) is more sensitive to changes in α
651 below the optimum than above it. If this is true it would explain why periods of below
652 optimum growth are more acutely experienced by industrial societies than are periods of
653 above optimum growth periods^{vi}. Figure 6 also shows the effects of doubling the integration
654 timescale T . As T is increased the optimal growth rate falls because the effects of the long-
655 run growth on supportive energy (equation 6) weigh more than those of short-term losses
656 (equation 8). This is equivalent to an inter-generational view of sustainability in that, by
657 extending the integration interval beyond an individualistic working lifetime, growth is
658 moderated.

659 **9. Concluding remarks**

660 In this paper we offer a novel analysis of the behaviour of industrial society based on the
661 physical behaviour of distribution networks. Specifically, we have used global energy use
662 data to explore our hypothesis that industrial society progressively fills space as it grows and
663 that innovations are continually used to overcome the increasing size-related penalties of
664 this growth.

665 In order for industrial society to grow, the Resource Acquisition, Distribution and End-use
666 (RADE) system must be adaptive because the optimal portfolio of resources and end-uses
667 and the appropriate networks linking the two cannot be known *a priori*. Solving this problem
668 under conditions of relatively deep uncertainty would require forms of dynamic optimisation.
669 As a result, it is not surprising that we see quite rich dynamic behaviour in the growth rate of

^{vi} In many respects this is linked to the concept of business cycle asymmetries; or what Keynes (1936) referred to as 'the phenomenon of the crisis – the fact that the substitution of a downward for an upward tendency often takes place suddenly and violently, whereas there is, as a rule, no such sharp turning-point when an upward is substituted for a downward tendency.

670 global primary energy use about its long run value of $\sim 2.4\% \text{ yr}^{-1}$ (Jarvis and Hewitt, 2014).
671 Such behaviour is clearly not planned centrally, but emerges through the free exchange of
672 information afforded by globalised market mechanisms.

673 We have identified three distinct points at which we believe the innovations necessary for
674 adaptation occur: at the point of acquisition of resources from the environment; during their
675 distribution; and during their conversion at points of end-use. Without such adaptive capacity
676 both resource availability and their associated distribution costs should limit growth.

677 Within the framework we have set out, growth in global primary energy use is fundamentally
678 controlled by the optimisation of the RADE system. We have speculated that this
679 optimisation is driven by the inherent desire of people in industrial societies to minimise
680 energy losses and hence maximise work. Since people are only able to significantly
681 influence such decisions during their working lifetimes it may not be surprising that the
682 growth in industrial society appears to be regulated on this timescale.

683 We acknowledge there are many contentious points in our discussion that challenge
684 conventional views about how industrial society behaves. If it could be stated with
685 confidence that the behaviour of industrial society is largely known, then our attempts to offer
686 an alternative perspective could be considered foolish. However, industrial society must rank
687 as one of the most complex objects in the known universe and our understanding of its
688 behaviour remains poor, to say the least. Utilising theoretical insights from other fields in
689 order to explore this behaviour appears a reasonable strategy. The same can be said for
690 exploiting long run global energy use data given that changes in energy use are obviously
691 coupled with the evolution of global industrial society. However, significant further work is
692 required to substantiate or refute our arguments. This is ongoing.

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792 **Figure legends**

793 **Figure 1. a.** The relationship between global primary energy use, x , and global final energy,
794 x^* . Two definitions of final energy are shown; (o) are the IEA estimates, (●) are the IEA
795 estimates adjusted for energy used for transport, agriculture, forestry, mining and quarrying.
796 **b.** The relationship between global primary energy use, x , and primary to final network
797 efficiency, defined as the ratio x^*/x (●). Also shown are the estimated variations in end-use
798 efficiency assuming a total system efficiency 10 percent (+). The IEA definition of primary to
799 final energy efficiencies (o) are also shown for reference. **c.** The relationship between global
800 primary energy use, x , and global anthropogenic CO₂ emissions, y , for the data shown in
801 Figure 1. **d.** The relationship between global primary energy use, x , and the carbon intensity
802 of global primary energy, x/y . The bands for all plots represent 5th to 95th uncertainty ranges
803 from the linear regressions. See text for all data sources and compilation.

804 **Figure 2.** The relationship between country specific primary energy use, x_i , and final energy
805 use, x_i^* for the period 1971 – 2010. Individual countries are marked with different colours, N
806 = 140. The data for all countries for 2010 are marked separately (o). All country specific
807 energy data are normalised using the surface area of the country. The surface area is an
808 imperfect proxy for the space occupied by each country if the global system is filling a three
809 dimensional volume. In the absence of data, we assume that the magnitude of the vertical
810 dimension is constant across all 140 countries. Note that the higher per unit area energy
811 consumers have per unit area energy flows that are a significant proportion of the solar
812 constant. The inset figure shows both the exponential scaling coefficient estimated from the
813 annual relationship between x_i and x_i^* (values near 1) along with the primary to final energy
814 efficiency x_i^*/x_i plotted for each year 1970 to 2010. The bands represent 5th to 95th
815 uncertainty range for the estimates. See text for data sources and compilation.

816 **Figure 3. i.** Annual global primary energy use [11,12,13] with regression line given by $\ln x$
817 $= a(t - t_1)$; $a = 0.0238 \pm 0.0008 \text{ yr}^{-1}$; $t_1 = 1775 \pm 3.5 \text{ CE}$. **ii.** Annual global anthropogenic CO₂
818 emissions [15, 16, 17] with regression line given by $\ln y = b(t - t_1)$; $b = 0.0179 \pm 0.0006 \text{ yr}^{-1}$; t_1

819 = 1883 ± 1.7 AD. **iii.** Carbon intensity of global primary energy determined by the ratio y/x .
820 See text for data sources and compilation.

821 **Figure 4.** A schematic 1D representation of the global RADE system. Here units of primary
822 energy, x , are linked to those of final energy, x^* , via a distribution network. The black
823 outlined system represents the initial stage of the systems evolution. The red outlined
824 system represents the subsequent addition of units of final energy use and hence primary
825 energy use and hence the expansion of the network linking the two.

826 **Figure 5.** The system diagram representation of the endogenous growth model set out in
827 equations (1 to 5). Numbers in boxes denote which equations apply. s in the 'construction'
828 transfer function is the derivative operator, d/dt .

829 **Figure 6.** The relationship between the relative growth rate on global primary energy, a , and
830 the total energy not directly used in growth, X_s . Two scenarios are presented, one with an
831 integration timescale of $T = 42$ years (—) and one with an integration timescale of $T = 84$
832 years (—).

833




Figure 1.




Figure 2.




Figure 3.




Figure 4.




Figure 5.




Figure 6.