

1 **Resource acquisition, distribution and end-use efficiencies and the**
2 **growth of industrial society**

3 **A.J.** Jarvis*, Lancaster Environment Centre, Lancaster University, UK

4 **S.J.** Jarvis[†], Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, London, UK

5 **C. N.** Hewitt, Lancaster Environment Centre, Lancaster University, UK

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7 * Correspondence

8 [†] The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily
9 represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, Ofgem or the Gas and Electricity
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11

12 **Abstract**

13 **A key feature of the growth of industrial society is the acquisition of increasing**
14 **quantities of resources from the environment and their distribution for end-use. With**
15 **respect to energy, the growth of industrial society appears to have been near**
16 **exponential for the last 160 years. We provide evidence that indicates that the global**
17 **distribution of resources that underpins this growth may be facilitated by the**
18 **continual development and expansion of near optimal directed networks (roads,**
19 **railways, flight paths, pipelines, cables etc.). However, despite this continual striving**
20 **for optimisation, the distribution efficiencies of these networks must decline over time**
21 **as they expand due to path lengths becoming longer and more tortuous. Therefore, to**
22 **maintain long-term exponential growth the physical limits placed on the distribution**
23 **networks appear to be counteracted by innovations deployed elsewhere in the**
24 **system, namely at the points of acquisition and end-use of resources. We postulate**
25 **that the maintenance of the growth of industrial society, as measured by global**
26 **energy use, at the observed rate of $\sim 2.4 \text{ \%yr}^{-1}$, stems from an implicit desire to**
27 **optimise patterns of energy use over human working lifetimes.**

28 **Keywords**

29 Global, Energy, Networks, Growth.

30 **1. Introduction**

31 The growth of industrial society since the Industrial Revolution has required the continual
32 exploitation of a diverse range of environmentally-derived resources. Because resources are
33 seldom consumed at the point of extraction, this in turn has required the construction of
34 ever-expanding distribution networks. These networks can be seen to form part of a global
35 Resource Acquisition, Distribution and End-use (RADE) system linking environmental
36 resources with points of end-use. In many respects these man-made networks resemble
37 those seen in natural systems, both in terms of form and function. ~~Here we therefore attempt~~
38 to apply theoretical insights from research into the evolution of natural systems to the man-
39 made system that constitutes global industrial society, ~~with a particular focus on energy.~~

40 This paper builds on a long tradition of attempting to understand socio-economic systems
41 through the application of insights from the natural sciences. Initially these insights were
42 largely metaphoric, but increasingly the application of evolutionary (Nelson and Wilson,
43 1982), metabolic (Fischer-Kowalski and Huttler, 1998) and thermodynamic (Garrett, 2011,
44 2012) theories has become much more direct in this area. The fundamental physical
45 constraints that underpin the development of distribution networks have previously been
46 used to try and explain the behaviour of biological systems (West et al., 1997), river basins
47 (Rodríguez-Iturbe and Rinaldo, 1997), electricity grids, water distribution systems, ~~and~~ road
48 networks (Dalgaard and Strulik, 2011; Pauliuka et al., 2014; Bettencourt et al., 2007), and
49 even cities (Bettencourt, 2013), but have not previously been applied to the behaviour and
50 growth of global industrial society itself.

51 Here we explore the possibility that the growth of industrial society is in part regulated by the
52 behaviour of the distribution networks within a global RADE system. The resources moved

53 by man-made distribution networks include energy and the other materials from which
54 industrial society is constructed. In the following analysis we focus specifically on the energy
55 used in acquisition, distribution and end-use. We do this because the performance of RADE
56 networks is ~~often~~-determined by their energy efficiency (i.e. the proportion of energy lost in
57 transporting mass across networks) and because energy use is one of the best observed
58 metrics of global economic activity. Furthermore, because all aspects of industrial society
59 use energy, and are themselves constructed using energy, a potentially self-reinforcing
60 feedback exists between energy use and the growth of industrial society.

61 Our analysis ~~would~~-suggests that:

- 62 1) By definition, resource distribution networks must ~~fill~~ the space occupied by industrial
63 society. ~~These~~ networks appear to behave near optimally with respect to minimising
64 energy losses if the space being filled is three dimensional.
- 65 2) Whether optimal or not, the distribution efficiency of the global RADE system
66 declines ~~over time~~, apparently due to the increasing distribution costs associated with
67 growth-induced network expansion;
- 68 3) This declining distribution efficiency appears to be offset by increasing acquisition
69 and end-use efficiencies. This is ~~because-evidenced by the observed~~ near constant
70 relative growth rate in energy use ~~is-that~~ maintained at the global scale despite ~~the~~
71 declining distribution efficiencies.~~y-~~
- 72 4) The maintenance of growth in energy use at the global scale, specifically at the
73 observed long-term average of $\sim 2.4\% \text{ yr}^{-1}$, may be explained by the minimisation of
74 energy losses over a timescale characteristic of human working lifetimes.

75 The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the distribution network theory that
76 underpins the work. This is then used in Section 3 to specify and test a predicted scaling

77 relationship between energy flows at the point of acquisition (global primary energy) and
78 those arriving at the points of end-use (global final energy). Section 4 is a discussion on the
79 geometry of the space being filled by the RADE system. Section 5 extends the analysis to
80 consider behaviour at the country scale and how this aggregates to give the observed global
81 scale behaviour. Section 6 then explores how the observed global trends (at least with
82 respect to primary energy) may extend back to at least 1850. In so doing we focus in on one
83 of the specific mechanisms that appears to mediate the evolution of the RADE system,
84 namely the dematerialisation of resource flows. Section 7 offers a simple model of the full
85 RADE system that accounts for the exponential growth in global energy use observed. This
86 model yields constant relative growth in energy use despite the decreasing returns to scale
87 associated with the expansion of the RADE distribution network(s). Section 8 uses this
88 simple model to attempt to account for the specific observed long term relative growth rate in
89 global primary energy use of $\sim 2.4\% \text{ yr}^{-1}$. This is done by exploring an optimisation of
90 average personal energy use over specific integration timescales. Finally, Section 9 offers
91 some concluding remarks concerning the growth of industrial society in general and some
92 thoughts on further work.

93 **2. Energy and resource distribution networks**

94 Resource distribution networks are ubiquitous in nature. Specifically, in biology- these
95 networks, such as cardio-vascular systems in mammals and vascular systems in higher
96 plants, distribute resources from points of acquisition to the end-use tissues and cells **which**
97 **require** these resources to function. Because this form of spatial distribution must itself
98 consume a significant proportion of the acquired energy resources, this has provided strong
99 selective pressure for the evolution of optimal forms of network architecture and operation,
100 with branched directed networks becoming ubiquitous in nature (Savage et al., 2004).
101 Furthermore, biological systems are frequently comprised of complex networks of networks.
102 These networks often co-evolve together as parts of an overall system that both collects and
103 distributes resources, e.g. lungs, blood, lymph, and nerves in animals. This means that the

104 networks can be configured both many-to-one (i.e. **points of acquisition** to collection point)
105 and one-to-many (i.e. distribution point to points of end-use) within the same organism.
106 Interestingly, these integrated systems still appear to follow the same theoretical laws, and
107 thus exhibit the same scaling behaviour, as single directed networks (Savage et al., 2004).

108 ~~As stated in the introduction~~We believe it is self-evident that, the growth of industrial society
109 has also required the construction of ever-expanding resource distribution networks. These
110 networks include a wide range of infrastructures such as pipes, cables, footpaths, roads,
111 railways, shipping lanes and flight paths. The resources being distributed through these
112 networks are also diverse, ~~including e.g.~~ energy, raw materials, manufactured goods, waste,
113 people etc. Here we focus largely on flows of energy. These flows originate from the
114 acquisition of environmentally derived resources ~~and which~~ pass through **distribution**
115 networks to points of end-use. These terminal points of the networks can be thought of as
116 units of energy consumption distributed in the space occupied by industrial society. Taken as
117 a whole, we view this entire process as a Resource Acquisition, Distribution and End-use
118 (RADE) system.

119 RADE networks are optimised by minimising energy distribution losses whilst facilitating
120 resource use (West et al., 1997; Banavar et al., 2010). For energy flows we can define the
121 distribution efficiency of such networks by the ratio of the energy entering the network
122 (primary energy, x) to that arriving at the points of end-use (final energy, x^*). Networks can
123 be thought of as optimal if, under the constraint of having to satisfy particular end-use
124 demand, the distribution losses, $x - x^*$, are minimised for any given x and hence the
125 distribution efficiency can be defined as x^*/x . Maximisation of this distribution efficiency
126 (x^*/x) can be achieved by either minimising total path lengths or maximising unit path length
127 efficiencies.

128 One of the most effective means of minimising path lengths is to **optimise the structure of the**
129 **system by** co-locating points of end-use at optimal locations within RADE networks. Such

130 behaviour is ubiquitous in industrial society expressed through the process of urbanisation.
131 As for unit path length efficiencies, these can be affected by the method of distribution and
132 the nature of the **resource** being distributed. ~~Two examples include are~~ the increasing use of
133 more fuel efficient vehicles and the liquefaction of natural gas for transportation. ~~as Liquefied~~
134 ~~Natural Gas (LNG).~~ It is also important to appreciate that path lengths and their efficiencies
135 are not only determined by infrastructural modes of distribution and the geographies of
136 points of end-use but also by decisions that people make when choosing between the
137 pathways available to them. For example, there may be many routes between two locations,
138 but quicker and less arduous routes are generally preferred.

139 In summary, our conceptual model of the distribution element of the global RADE system is
140 one of a space-filling network linking points of environmental resource acquisition to points of
141 societal end-use. To explore the possibility that the distribution element of the global RADE
142 system behaves in this way we now investigate the relationship between global primary
143 energy use, x , and global final energy use, x^* . We refrain from looking at the architectures of
144 specific networks because, as stated previously, our analysis is largely dependent on flows
145 of energy at the global scale. As such, we believe it is the emergent behaviour of the
146 network of networks that comprise the global RADE system that is relevant. This suggests
147 that the behaviour of individual network elements must be considered within the context of
148 the other network elements they operate alongside.

149 **3. Primary and final energy flows at the global scale**

150 As discussed previously, one definition of an optimal network is where distributional energy
151 losses are minimised. ~~West and co-workers~~ (West et al. (1997)) employed an optimal
152 model of a fractal space-filling network to demonstrate how distribution networks in nature
153 can give rise to observed scaling patterns. Banavaar et al. (2010) showed that these
154 patterns were not restricted to fractal networks. Although not articulated in these papers,
155 both of these analyses elude to a theoretical upper limit of the distribution efficiency x^*/x for
156 any given space being occupied by a distribution network. If L is the linear size of the

157 network then the size of the space being filled by the network is given by L^D where D is the
158 dimension of the space being filled by the network. Independent of the specific modelling
159 assumptions considered by either West or Banavaar, to be consistent with their modelling
160 results, optimal network efficiency has to scale with network size according to $x^*/x \propto L^{D/(D+1)}$.
161 This even holds as L tends to zero because D must also tend to zero in the limit, so
162 the efficiency of the network has a theoretical unity upper limit even as $L \rightarrow 0$.

163 The scaling relationship between x^*/x and L suggests that the relationship between the
164 energy arriving at the points of final use, x^* , and the primary energy flow entering the
165 network, x , should scale as $x^* \propto x^{D/(D+1)}$. This is the same scaling relationship proposed by
166 Dalgaard and Strulik (2011), building on Banavar et al., (2010), when attempting to account
167 for the energy distribution losses in the US electricity grid. The reason for sub-unity scaling
168 between x^* and x is simply because as the size of the system increases so does its average
169 path length between points of acquisition and end-use, L . This increase in path length
170 causes the distribution efficiency, x^*/x , to fall. However, rather than the efficiency falling in
171 proportion to increases in network size, L^D , it falls in proportion to $L^{D/(D+1)}$, i.e. at a rate
172 slower than one would predict from geometric considerations alone. This is because of the
173 optimisation of the distribution links within the RADE network as discussed earlier.

174 We define global primary energy use, x , as the annual energy flow from nature to society in
175 the form of wood, coal, oil, gas, nuclear, renewables and food. Primary energy is generally
176 treated as the combustible energy equivalent of these sources. This does introduce some
177 complexity when handling non-combustible sources (e.g. wood used for construction);
178 Macknick, 2009), but given these are such a small fraction of the total this is not believed to
179 significantly affect the quality of the aggregate global primary energy data significantly ;
180 (Macknick, 2009). For completeness we also include an estimate of total food use in ~~was~~
181 estimated by assuming global per capita consumption of 3×10^9 J yr⁻¹ (United Nations,
182 2002), although again, presently this represents this is a very small less than 1%, albeit
183 important, fraction of the total.

184 We define x^* (final energy use) as the energy available to industrial society once distribution
185 losses have been accounted for. The International Energy Agency (IEA) provides estimates
186 of energy lost through its acquisition, processing and delivery to end users. However, these
187 data do not account for energy losses associated with either the acquisition of non-energy
188 resources and agriculture or the transport of all mass through industrial society. ~~To~~In an
189 effort attempt to account for these losses to obtain x^* we have subtracted the IEA estimates
190 of energy used in quarrying, mining, agriculture, forestry and, in particular, transport, from
191 the IEA final energy consumption data.

192 Considering transport as a distributional loss raises an important conceptual issue. Currently
193 approximately 50 percent of transport energy use is associated with passenger movements.
194 Traditionally these are seen as end-use energy services enjoyed by people. However, here
195 we treat them as necessary distributional losses required to get energy consumers to spatial
196 nodes where they can contribute to the continued growth of the RADE system. In other
197 words, we view the flow of people like the flow of any other mass in the RADE system.
198 Hence we view nodes of final consumption as static locations where final energy is
199 consumed, albeit with human agency applied to the purpose of consumption. Importantly,
200 this means that nodes are best viewed as more than just passive recipients of resource. —
201 Instead final consumption nodes must in turn facilitate the further acquisition of resources
202 through extending the interface between industrial society and the environment (Garrett,
203 2011, 2012). Taking this approach essentially means that all components of the RADE
204 system that are mobile are distributional and all static components are either acquiring
205 resources or using-consuming resources for end-use. Although this framing may be counter
206 contrary to more traditional views of humans as ‘energy consumers’ we believe it is at least
207 internally consistent with our view of the RADE system and the role of humans in it.

208 It should be noted that our estimates of x^* do not adequately account for the distribution
209 energy losses occurring between the point of sale and the point of end-use of energy (e.g. in
210 the case of electricity, losses occurring between the meter and the plug). However, we

211 assume these to be relatively small relative to all upstream losses associated with acquiring
212 and distributing all resources. The small underestimate of distributional loss implied by our
213 estimate of final energy using the IEA data should be partially offset by the fact that our
214 revision of the IEA final energy use will also include some non-distributional energy uses
215 (e.g. end-use energy in agriculture) due to the way the IEA data are compiled.

216 We define the space associated with unit final energy consumption (referred to as a “control
217 volume” by Dalgaard and Strulik, 2011) as being that where the consumption of useful
218 energy in that space is significantly greater than the transfer of useful energy from that space
219 to other regions of the network. These spaces are complex entities and not easy to identify,
220 ~~again~~ because in a global mean sense they are comprised of broad portfolios of energy
221 uses. That said, examples of end-use processes might include reading this article on a
222 computer, cooking, constructing or demolishing a building etc.

223 As for energy losses due to energy transformations that occur between primary and final
224 energy, these are far more significant. One way of reconciling these transformations within
225 the current framework is that they are deployed to reduce mass flows in critical parts of the
226 system (e.g. by generating electricity from coal). Here the substantial energy losses incurred
227 by these transformations are presumably offset by the downstream savings they facilitate (in
228 this example, by reducing the amount of coal distributed to individual households). This point
229 will be explored in greater detail in Section 4.

230 Figure 1a shows the relationship between x and x^* for the available IEA data. We find that
231 $x^* \propto x^c$ ($c = 0.75 \pm 0.02$)ⁱ, i.e. the scaling exponent c is statistically indistinguishable from
232 three quarters. For reference, using the IEA definition of final energy gives $c = 0.84 \pm 0.01$
233 with practically all of the difference between these two estimates attributable to the inclusion

ⁱ Scaling exponents have been estimated using ordinary least squares of the linear model $\ln(x^*) = \theta_1 \ln(x) + \theta_2$. Parameter uncertainties are reported at 95% confidence. 1σ uncertainties in the data were assumed to be 5 percent (Macknick, 2009). All results were also cross-checked using nonlinear least squares of the untransformed data.

234 of transport in our specification of final energy. Figure 1b shows the equivalent relationship
235 between the distribution efficiency, x^*/x , and primary energy, x . It confirms that, as
236 predicted, the overall efficiency of the network has progressively fallen over time as x has
237 increased and is now below 50 percent, i.e. more than half of all primary energy is now used
238 simply to move all the materials and resources required by industrial society (e.g.
239 environmentally-derived materials, mobile system infrastructure and people) to final nodes of
240 end-use.

241 4. What space does society inhabit?

242 The fact that we observe scaling between x^* and x that is statistically indistinguishable from
243 three quarters suggests $D = 3$ in the framework set out above. Although the relative
244 dimensions are far from equal, it is self-evident that the networks moving mass through
245 global industrial society clearly occupy a three dimensional space. However, since the
246 horizontal dimensions of this space occupied by global society are approximately three
247 orders of magnitude greater than the vertical dimension (delineated by, for example, the
248 distance between the deepest mines and the height at which aircraft fly), it is appropriate to
249 ask whether this space is more appropriately approximated by a two dimensional surface
250 rather than a three dimensional volume. This question cannot be answered conclusively
251 here but we offer the following lines of evidence to suggest that $D = 3$ could does indeed
252 provide a plausible description of the space filled by the global RADE system.

253 Firstly, the effect of gravity obviously imposes disproportionately higher distribution costs on
254 movement in the vertical dimension than in the horizontal. We conjecture that these
255 differences in cost are between one and two orders of magnitude. This could rise
256 significantly above three orders of magnitude when the engineering difficulties of exploring
257 the vertical dimension below ground are considered. Whether this is sufficient to result in D
258 = 3 in the global RADE networks is unclear although we note we invariably treat the
259 atmosphere as a three dimensional object even though it too has a severely diminished
260 vertical dimension. Secondly, the scaling behaviour of urban centres suggests that people

261 occupy a three dimensional space at the city scale, despite the fact that the vertical
262 dimension is again very much attenuated (Nordbeck, 1971). Even silicone chips, which
263 have a trivial vertical dimension, exhibit scaling of the order of $D = 2.5$ (Deng and Maly,
264 2004) suggesting that even a highly attenuated vertical dimension with no disproportional
265 losses can result in non-trivial scaling effects. Finally, although the Earth's surface can, by
266 definition, be considered a two dimensional object, the curvature of this surface at the global
267 scale may be sufficient to introduce third dimensional effects in the links between network
268 nodes.

269 An alternative explanation to our observed scaling behaviour of the global energy system is
270 that $D < 3$ and that the system operates supra-optimally, which appears infeasible. Equally,
271 the observed exponent of three quarters may have arisen by chance and the systemic
272 explanation explored here is incorrect. This proposition cannot be rejected, but then neither
273 can the proposition that $D = 3$. It also seems somewhat fortuitous that we would observe a
274 scaling exponent that is indistinguishable from three quarters.

275 If the global RADE network has the dimensions of $D = 3$, then the scaling observed between
276 x and x^* suggests that, at the global scale, the distribution networks that underpin the RADE
277 system are, in aggregate, optimised with respect to energy losses, despite filling a highly
278 irregular three dimensional space. That the RADE networks created within industrial society
279 should be near-optimal does not seem unreasonable given the pressures to seek out
280 performance improvements in a competitive global market system.

281 As a result of the framework set out above we ~~attempt to~~ identify three **key-related**
282 mechanisms through which distribution efficiency gains, and hence the optimisation of this
283 element of the global RADE system, ~~could~~ be realised.

284 1) The efficiency of network infrastructure is progressively improved **over time** (e.g. **by**
285 **the use of** more aerodynamic vehicles, **;** more efficient combustion processes **etc.**).

286 2) The flows are themselves persistently dematerialised **over time** (e.g. **by introduction**
287 **of lighter vehicles**,; shifting the primary fuel mix from wood to coal to oil to gas or
288 turning coal into electricity – see later – **etc.**).

289 3) The structure of and practices on the network are modified **over time to reduced**
290 **average path lengths, L** (e.g. **by building a new road**, **introducing** car navigation
291 systems, **by** ;the reorganisation of the points of acquisition and end-use during
292 urbanisation **etc.**).

293 The first two of these are primarily concerned with maximising unit path length efficiencies,
294 whilst the third is primarily concerned with minimising total path lengths. It may also be that
295 **processes like** urbanisation offers additional benefits in that the increased social interactions
296 that result from the clustering of people stimulate the innovations required to discover and
297 realise the **three** efficiency mechanisms mentioned above (Bettencourt, 2012). These
298 innovations have to be continuously discovered, developed and implemented in order to
299 accommodate the growth of the RADE system ~~as discussed in Section 7~~. We shall return to
300 the subject of resource flow dematerialisation in more detail in Section 6.

301 **5. What happens at the regional scale?**

302 Thus far our analysis has been focussed at the global scale, yet this global behaviour must
303 emerge from regional scale dynamics. Each region, i , uses primary energy, x_i , and final
304 energy, x_i^* , where $\sum x_i = x$ and $\sum x_i^* = x^*$. As we have already discussed, networks tend to
305 become less efficient as they expand due to the size-related penalties of growth. It appears
306 that this behaviour is observed at the global scale with x^*/x decreasing as x increases
307 (Figure 1b). In the absence of further innovation and all else remaining equal, we would
308 anticipate the same behaviour at the regional scale. **This means that in portions of the**
309 **system with higher energy use densities (i.e. higher energy use per unit space) we would**
310 **expect ~~it~~ lower regional distribution network efficiencies, x_i^*/x_i . ~~in portions of the system~~**
311 **with higher energy use per unit space**. Conversely, ~~we would also anticipate higher regional~~

312 ~~distribution network efficiencies~~ in portions of the system with lower energy use densities
313 (i.e. lower energy use per unit space) we would ~~also~~ anticipate higher regional distribution
314 network efficiencies. However, if this divergence in distribution efficiencies between regions,
315 due to differing ~~network energy use~~ densities, actually arose at any given point in time it
316 would presumably cause the global system to be sub-optimal because global final energy
317 use could be increased for the same global primary energy use simply by shifting resource
318 distribution from the less efficient to the more efficient portions of the system.

319 This sub-optimality is not what we observe at the global scale. Instead, as discussed above,
320 the observed approximate three quarter scaling between x and x^* indicates that the global
321 RADE system is operating near-optimally with respect to distribution if $D = 3$. Because the
322 system appears it could be near-optimal at the global scale, we would expect distribution
323 efficiency gains to be persistently sought out. In other words, if optimal, the RADE system
324 would evolve such that it seeks to exhaust all potential improvements with respect to energy
325 use. As a result, we hypothesise that, at any particular point in time, all countries of the world
326 should have similar network efficiencies and these should be independent of their energy
327 use densities (i.e. their x_i per unit space). In order to achieve this, countries located in more
328 energy dense (i.e. more developed) portions of the system presumably innovate more
329 aggressively on distribution efficiency to overcome the size-related penalties of growth than
330 do those in less energy dense (i.e. less developed) portions of the system. Once again,
331 examples of these innovations might be the enhanced efficiency of mass transport,
332 enhanced urbanisation and the enhanced use of gas or electricity.

333 We test this hypothesis using IEA data for 140 countries for the period 1971 – 2010. Figure 2
334 shows the relationship between primary and final energy use (x_i and x_i^*) for these data. In
335 the absence of a measure of the effective volume being filled by society, we have
336 normalised energy use by country land area in order to attempt to reflect the space-filling
337 aspect of the system. Because this assumes uniform average vertical dimensions between

338 countries and is applied to both x_i and x_i^* , this only changes the relative positions of
339 countries, not their individual efficiencies.

340 As predicted, Figure 2 shows that at any given point in time x_i^*/x_i is largely independent of x_i
341 ($x_i^* \propto x_i^c$; $c = 0.97 \pm 0.03$ for all 40 years). This appears to hold across all 140 countries
342 sampled, which have a range of 10^5 in energy use per unit area. For example,
343 ~~presently~~currently the UK has a similar distribution efficiency, x_i^*/x_i , to that of Bolivia (0.473
344 vs. 0.466), despite having $>10^2$ greater energy use density. A significant contributor to the
345 variation in x_i^* and x_i is probably the less reliable IEA energy data for less-developed
346 countries. We note that the variation created by these uncertainties is not systematically
347 above or below the central trend. Moreover, we would expect the relationship to be even
348 clearer if we were able to normalise the data by the appropriate volume, rather than area,
349 occupied by society in each country.

350 Because of the apparent invariance of distribution network efficiency with energy use density
351 it would ~~suggest~~appear that regional networks are not scaled versions of the global system,
352 i.e. the global RADE network appears to be scale dependent rather than scale free. This
353 implies that you cannot simply look at isolated sub-components of the global RADE network
354 (e.g. individual countries) in order to infer the behaviour of the global system.

355 **6. Long-run growth and decarbonisation of global energy use**

356 Thus far we have focussed on data on primary and final energy use covering the last 40
357 years. However, there ~~is~~are data on primary energy use going back much further than this.
358 As mentioned earlier, global primary energy use, x , is taken here to be the annual energy
359 flow from ~~nature~~the environment to society in the form of wood, coal, oil, gas, nuclear,
360 renewables and food. In order to construct a consistent time series for x since 1850,
361 following Jarvis et al. (2012), the global primary energy use data for the period 1850 to 1964
362 are taken from Grubler (2003) and for the period from 1965 to 2010 from BP (2011). ~~We~~
363 ~~note that compiling long-term historic series for virtually any relevant measure of economic~~

364 activity is challenging due to the paucity of available data and increasing uncertainties the
365 further back one goes. Data on energy use is not exempt from these limitations. For
366 example, the Grubler data we use do not appear to capture the full portfolio of renewables in
367 use in the 1800's (e.g. wind and water power). However, we also note that the energy data
368 used here still represents one of the best observed metrics of global economic activity. Also
369 on the specific issue of renewables post-1850, evidence suggests that they were reconstituted
370 a negligible part of the global energy portfolio during this period (O'Connor and Cleveland,
371 2014, and Fouquet, 2014).

372 We opt to use the BP data in order to attempt to have some limited independence from the
373 IEA data used to explore the relationship between x and x^* . To produce a homogenous
374 record for 1850 to 2010 the mean difference between the two series for the period 1965 to
375 1995 (which is largely due to lack of wood fuel use in the BP dataset) was added to the BP
376 data. The data were converted from tonnes of oil equivalent (toe) to Joules, assuming 10^{18} J
377 $= 2.38 \times 10^7 \text{ toe}$ (Sims et al., 2007).

378 Figure 3 shows the primary energy use data, x , for the period 1850-2010. This-These
379 suggests that, in the long term, x has grown near exponentially since at least 1850, with a
380 long term relative growth rate of $2.4 (\pm 0.08) \% \text{ yr}^{-1}$ (Jarvis et al. 2012)ⁱⁱ. Using global Gross
381 Domestic Product (GDP) data as a proxy for global energy use, Garrett (2014) suggests that
382 the relative growth rate of global primary energy has increased significantly over this period.
383 The data and analysis in Figure 3 that it would indicate otherwise, although clearly there
384 are significant uncertainties over actual global primary energy measures both now and more
385 significantly pre-1900. For example it is unclear what contribution wind makes through

ⁱⁱ Relative growth rates have been estimated using ordinary least squares of the general linear model $\ln(x) = \theta(t - t_1)$. Parameter uncertainties are reported at 95% confidence. The model residuals, which were significantly autocorrelated, have been de-correlated assuming a first-order autoregressive noise model to minimize any bias in the estimates of θ . 1σ uncertainties in the data were assumed to be 5 percent in energy use and fossils fuel emissions (Macknick, 2009); and 20 percent in land-based emissions (Le Quere, pers comms).

386 shipping over this period. That said, ~~That that~~ the long-run growth in primary energy use
387 observed over the last 40 years actually appears to extend back at least 160 years suggests
388 that the processes and trends that have underpinned the development of the global RADE
389 system may have actually been operating for considerably longer than the IEA data ~~are able~~
390 ~~to attest~~ provide evidence for. If this is the case we would predict that the optimisation
391 mechanisms identified earlier would also have been at work over the same period. In
392 particular, we would expect that these optimisation mechanisms would be sought out and
393 implemented at a rate that matches the growth-induced declines in distribution efficiency
394 experienced by the global RADE system revealed in Figure 1b.

395 To explore this proposition we focus on the dematerialisation of resource flows. The primary
396 energy carrier for industrial society is carbon, and in fact some estimates suggest that
397 carbon currently accounts for as much as 50 percent of the total amount of materials moved
398 by industrial society through its RADE networks (Dittrich and Bringezu, 2010). This material
399 flow ultimately leads to the emissions of carbon dioxide as carbon-based energy carriers are
400 consumed. Hence the emission rates of carbon dioxide can be seen as giving a measure of
401 the flow of carbon-based energy carriers through the RADE system. In the context of the
402 distribution costs of resources, decarbonisation can therefore be viewed as merely one,
403 albeit important, component of a general systemic dematerialisation of resource flows
404 (Ausubel, 1989) through the RADE system (~~Ausubel, 1989~~). Here dematerialisation is taken
405 as the removal of 'unnecessary' mass from resource flows through innovation. This systemic
406 dematerialisation ~~and would~~ is almost certainly not ~~be~~ unique to carbon and may indeed be a
407 necessary response to the increasing distribution costs inherent in any expanding network.

408 To estimate the amount of carbon flowing through the RADE system we use global carbon
409 emissions data from Houghten (2010), Boden et al. (2010) and Peters et al. (2012)ⁱⁱⁱ. Figure

ⁱⁱⁱ As in Jarvis et al (2012), we have included land use change in the measurement of carbon emissions because our definition of x necessarily includes wood use. However, although deforestation dominates the land use change emissions estimates, not all deforestation emissions are associated directly with the production and distribution of wood as a fuel, as they include significant

410 3 shows that global carbon emissions, y , have also grown near-exponentially since at least
411 1850 at the long-term rate of $1.8 (\pm 0.06)\% \text{ yr}^{-1}$ (Jarvis et al. 2012). The difference between
412 this growth rate and the growth rate of primary energy indicates that the global primary
413 energy portfolio has been systematically decarbonised at a rate of $\sim 0.6\% \text{ yr}^{-1}$ since at least
414 1850 (Jarvis et al., 2012). This decarbonisation is normally viewed as being the result of
415 societal preferences for cleaner, more convenient, energy carriers (Grübler and Nakienovic,
416 1996). It has also been partially attributed to improvements in the efficiency of converting
417 solid, liquid and gaseous fuels to electricity (Nakienovic, 1993). Both these explanations
418 seem unsatisfactory given the constant long-run nature of the decline in carbon intensity.
419 Furthermore, conversion efficiency affects the distribution efficiency, x^*/x , and hence x^* . It
420 does not directly affect the primary portfolio comprising x . Instead, it is more appropriate to
421 consider innovations on energy transformations as co-evolving with the portfolio of global
422 primary energy. More specifically, **it appears to us** that the pattern of decarbonisation of the
423 global energy portfolio is in line with, **and a necessary response to**, the declining distribution
424 efficiency of the global RADE network, x^*/x .

425 The long-term exponential growth in both x and y set out above suggests that global primary
426 energy use and carbon flows share a common exponential scaling relationship, $y \propto x^{b/a}$,
427 where a and b are the relative growth rates of x and y respectively. Figure 1c shows the
428 scaling relationship between x and y since 1850. From these data we see that the
429 exponential scaling between x and y is not only a property of the 160 year average
430 behaviour, but also holds remarkably well on intervening timescales. This relationship has a
431 scaling exponent of $b/a = 0.76 (\pm 0.05)$. Calculating this exponent using the long-term (160

contributions from slash-and-burn land clearance activities for food production. Furthermore, carbon neutral biomass production is not accommodated by net anthropogenic CO₂ emissions inventories. Between 1850 and 1900 wood fuel use constituted a significant proportion of global primary energy use (Grubler, 2008) but beyond 1900 their contribution to global carbon use quickly become dominated by fossil fuels.

432 year) exponents for x and y gives $b/a = 0.75 (\pm 0.06)$. As with the primary to final scaling
433 identified earlier, this too is statistically indistinguishable from three quarters.

434 The scaling observed between x^* and x and between y and x therefore leads to direct
435 proportionality between carbon intensity and network distribution efficiency ($y/x \propto x^f x^*/x$, c
436 $= -0.006 \pm 0.043$, hence $x^f \approx 1$; see Figure 2c & d). As predicted then, the implementation of
437 dematerialisation appears to occur at a rate that is proportional to the growth-induced
438 declines in distribution efficiency experienced by the global RADE system. This would
439 appear to further corroborate our view of the role of the distribution networks that make up
440 the global RADE system. Interestingly, the result of the scaling between x , x^* and y also
441 indicates that total global anthropogenic CO₂ emissions grow in proportion to the
442 consumption of final energy, x^* , not primary energy, x .

443 To place our interpretation of the role of decarbonisation of the primary fuel mix in context,
444 the historic trend in primary energy use from wood to coal to oil to gas and renewables has
445 occurred because it has allowed less mass to be transported through the RADE network per
446 unit of energy used (Ausubel, 1989). Fundamentally this represents an innovation on the
447 distribution efficiency, x^*/x .

448 The recent shift towards the use of gas globally (ExxonMobil, 2013) represents a particularly
449 interesting continuation of this trend. Gas has a lower unit volume energy density than other
450 fossil fuel sources (i.e. coal or oil). Lower energy density carriers like gas suffer from higher
451 long distance transportation costs, which is presumably why a smaller proportion of gas is
452 traded internationally than oil or coal (ExxonMobil, 2013). However, gas also incurs lower
453 energetic costs when being distributed through the more tortuous finer terminal parts of the
454 distribution network (Banavar et al. 2010).

455 To illustrate this point it is useful to consider the paths that make up the global distribution
456 network as passing through three stages: the gathering together of resources from their
457 extraction points in the environment; the intermediate transportation of resources from

458 regions of extraction to regions of end-use; and **finally-lastly** the distribution of resources to
459 the nodes of final end-use (see Figure 4). As the global distribution network develops, the
460 relative importance of these three network elements in controlling overall distribution costs
461 should change. This is because, although the long distance intermediate costs increase as
462 the network expands, the final distribution costs increase faster (Banavar et al., 2010). This
463 concept is already well established in transportation and telecommunications networks as
464 ‘the last mile problem’. So as the RADE system as a whole grows, low carbon energy
465 carriers such as gas are increasingly preferred, and this preference is most keenly felt in the
466 final distribution elements of the RADE system. This seems intuitive when one imagines the
467 vastly increased distributional costs that an advanced (i.e. energy dense) country like
468 Germany would incur if it tried to meet its energy demands for heating and cooking solely
469 through distributing coal to **individual** end users, instead of by the increasing use of gas.

470 This demand for low-carbon energy carriers in the terminal parts of the RADE system may
471 also stimulate innovations such as the liquefaction of natural gas (LNG) because LNG
472 reduces the costs of moving gas long distances during intermediate transportation. Similarly,
473 innovations in hydraulic fracturing can allow exploitation of gas resources near to the final
474 point of use, removing some of the need for long distance transport. Lastly, electrification is
475 currently the primary means of dematerialising energy flows through transformation and, just
476 as with gas, the lower energetic costs of transmitting electricity are most effectively deployed
477 in the final distribution parts of the network, e.g. in developed, urbanised areas. This would
478 explain why decarbonisation is sometimes associated with energy transformation efficiencies
479 given that both would co-evolve as distribution networks expand. However, we would argue
480 it is misleading to implicate conversion efficiency as a driver for the decarbonisation of
481 energy portfolios. **ItFinally, it** is interesting to note from Figure 3 that the recent increase in
482 **global** coal use, which **would-tends to** counter **any-the long term trend of** decarbonisation
483 **trend**, has been largely offset at the global scale by the increased use of gas, renewables
484 and decreases in land-based emissions. **Furthermore, the vast majority of this coal is not**
485 **distributed to final points of end-use as it was a century ago. Instead it is used to generate**

486 electricity which is then distributed to end users, which is consistent with the process of
487 dematerialisation discussed above.

488 7. Total energy efficiency and growth – a model

489 If industrial society does indeed experience declining network distribution efficiency, as
490 indicated by Figure 2b, then, all else remaining equal, global industrial society should
491 experience size-related limits to growth in x , just as growth is self-limiting in most biological
492 systems (West et al., 2001). It is possible that the observed long-term exponential growth in
493 x could reflect the early stages of what is otherwise logistic size-restricted growth. ~~and that if~~
494 ~~this is the case then~~ ultimately the growth of the global RADE system ~~is-would be~~ self-
495 limiting, even though primary energy use has risen exponentially and by ~50 fold since 1850.
496 This in and of itself is a fascinating prospect.

497 However, we argue that global industrial society is continually innovating to overcome the
498 increasing size-related penalties associated with growth. This seems consistent with the
499 apparent growth imperative of industrial society and the fact that the observed declines in
500 distribution efficiency shown in Figure 1b have been countered in order to maintain the near
501 constant relative growth rate of $\sim 2.4\% \text{ yr}^{-1}$ shown in Figure 3. We illustrate this point with the
502 following simple endogenous growth model in which we treat global industrial society as a
503 homogenous unit.

504 As global society grows, it acquires additional primary energy flows to support additional end
505 uses, the two being linked by extensions to existing networks. Therefore, we can
506 conceptualise the growth of industrial society both as its expansion into new environmental
507 resources, and hence space, and the establishment of new points of end-use. Although the
508 space occupied by industrial society is complex, if $D = 3$, then it is appropriate to consider
509 society as occupying an (irregular) volume, V . ~~If the end-use control volumes are considered~~
510 ~~as being within V then, from a network perspective, it is also reasonable to assume the in-~~
511 ~~use environmental resources are also within V , i.e. industrial society grows into its~~

512 resources (Garrett, 2011). If so, then we assume in the simplest case that the flow of
513 resource into industrial society is proportional to the volume of resources subsumed and
514 hence V^{iv} . ~~Environmental resources are acquired across the society-environment interface.~~
515 ~~The shape of this interface is complex and hence its dimension difficult to specify. For~~
516 ~~simplicity we will assume it is simply proportional to the size of industrial society and hence~~
517 ~~†~~. Therefore, in the absence of any storage, the supply and consumption of primary energy
518 resources might simply be described by

$$519 \quad x = k_A V \quad (1)$$

520 where the proportionality k_A is the resource acquisition efficiency ~~at the environment-society~~
521 ~~interface~~ and is the product of the energy potential between the environmentally-derived
522 energy resources and society and the efficiency with which these resources can be
523 ~~assimilated into the RADE system and hence into industrial society~~ ~~moved across this~~
524 ~~interface~~.

525 Assuming networks distribute captured resources optimally within the volume, V , then the
526 final energy flow arriving at points of end-use, x^* , is given by

$$527 \quad x^* = gx^{D/(D+1)} \quad (2)$$

528 where g is a scaling constant (Dalgaard and Strulik, 2011). Once at the points of end-use,
529 and after subtracting the end-use inefficiencies (i.e. the costs of transforming final energy
530 into useful work), the remaining portion of x^* provides work which is used to increase the
531 size of industrial society (Garrett, 2011, 2012). This in turn expands V and allows the co-
532 option of further resources. Because it requires work to expand V , the size of industrial
533 society can also be viewed as the accumulation of this work, X , occupying the space, V .

^{iv} We note that Garrett (2014) assumes environmental resources flow to industrial society across an environment-society interface (surface) and hence speculates that this flow is proportional to $V^{1/3}$ on theoretical grounds.

534 The balance of this accumulated work can be seen as the difference between work done
535 and the decay of the stock of accumulated work,

$$536 \quad \frac{dX}{dt} = k_E x^* - k_D X \quad (3)$$

537 where k_E is the end-use efficiency of final energy conversion to useful work and k_D is the
538 aggregate decay rate of X .

539 Equations (1, 2 and 3) are exponential in x , in line with the observations in Figure 3, if $X \propto V$,
540 i.e. work operates uniformly in space. Because the mean energy density of industrial society
541 is unknown we assume $X = V$ for simplicity given this has no bearing on our analysis.

542 Equations (1, 2 & 3) now give

$$543 \quad \frac{dx}{dt} = (k_A k_E g x^{-1/4} - k_D) x = ax \quad (4)$$

544 where a is the relative growth rate of global primary energy, or $\sim 2.4\% \text{ yr}^{-1}$. From equation (4)
545 we see that $a \propto x^{-1/4}$ (West et al., 2001), i.e. as the system grows the relative growth rate
546 should fall. Therefore, in order to maintain exponential growth in x , the acquisition efficiency,
547 k_A , and/or the end-use efficiency, k_E , must be increased and/or the decay rate, k_D , must be
548 decreased to compensate for the declining capacity of primary energy to support growth.

549 We assume that both k_A and k_E are dynamically adjusted by society in order to maintain
550 growth, whilst k_D remains fixed. The assumption of a fixed decay rate is supported by the
551 observation that the mean lifetime of technologies (Grübler et al., 1999), including large
552 energy projects (Davis and Caldeira, 2010) has remained fairly constant at $\sim 42\text{-}40$ years, or
553 $(\sim 2.4\% \text{ yr}^{-1})^{-1}$, i.e. technologies decay at the same rate as the **relative** growth of industrial
554 society ($k_D = a$). One way of understanding such a link is that physical capital is turned over
555 at about the same rate as the system evolves, thereby allowing the appropriate rate of
556 adoption of the innovations required to preserve growth at the rate a .

557 In the absence of any change in the acquisition and end-use efficiencies, $a \propto x^{-1/4}$.

558 Therefore for a to remain constant requires

$$559 \quad k_A k_E = hx^{1/4} \quad (5)$$

560 where again h is a scaling constant. This now gives exponential growth in x as

$$561 \quad \frac{dx}{dt} = (hg - k_D)x = ax \quad (6)$$

562 and $hg = 2a$ if $k_D = a$ as discussed above. Within this framework, if $k_D = a$, the energy that is
563 available to grow X and hence V, x_G , is given by

$$564 \quad x_G = k_A^{-1} hgx = \varepsilon x \quad (7)$$

565 where ε is the overall primary to end-use energy efficiency of the RADE system (see also
566 [Garrett, 2011](#)). The observed near-constancy of the long-term relative growth rate in global
567 primary energy use strongly suggests that ε has remained more or less constant over at
568 least the last 160 years. Using IEA data, Nakicenovic et al. (1996) have estimated ε to be
569 ~30%, although this figure is highly uncertain because their analysis could not accurately
570 account for the end-use efficiency of final energy in productive work. Ayres (1989) attempted
571 a similar analysis for the US attempting to account for so called useful work (or exergy)
572 effects and derived an estimate of 2.5% for ε . In addition to the declining network distribution
573 efficiency x^*/x , Figure 1b also shows an illustration of the simultaneous increases in end-use
574 efficiencies, k_E , required to keep ε at a hypothetical value of 10%, assuming k_A is constant^v.

575 Figure 5 shows the model described above in block diagram form. ~~Interestingly, because this~~
576 ~~system is unstable (i.e. $\tau > 0$) as a result of the positive feedback between energy invested~~

^v Here 10 % is simply taken as an illustrative value for ε given its true value remains highly uncertain. This only affects the level of the relationship between x_G/x^* and x , not its scaling. Having assumed this value we can also specify a fixed value for k_A from equation (7) of $2a/0.1=0.5 \text{ yr}^{-1}$ for the case of $X = V$.

577 ~~and energy returned to growth, the full system Energy Returned on Energy Invested (ERoEI)~~
578 ~~is completely timescale dependent at the global scale and infinite in the limit. This explains~~
579 ~~why characterising ERoEI is problematic as the full system-wide effects of any investment~~
580 ~~have to be accounted for in order to capture all the associated returns.~~

581 **8. Growth optimisation and working lifetimes**

582 Thus far we have sought to illustrate how the growth of industrial society, as determined by
583 its energy use, could be controlled by the optimisation of the RADE network. In part this
584 optimisation is facilitated by reducing material flows including decarbonisation of the primary
585 energy portfolio. We have also attempted to show that, despite this optimisation, RADE
586 network efficiency necessarily falls. We have therefore set out how an observed near
587 constant relative growth rate is maintained through continuous but measured implementation
588 of innovations on both energy acquisition and end-use efficiencies. An important question
589 that remains is, if growth is desirable, why does industrial society only compensate for falling
590 distribution network efficiency, and not overcompensate to allow super-exponential growth?
591 Or, put another way, why is constant relative growth good? This cannot be due to the lack of
592 innovative capacity because there appears to be a surplus of this available to enhance
593 acquisition and end-use efficiencies in the global RADE system. This suggests that industrial
594 society is somehow self-regulated such that the relative growth rates of, for example, energy
595 use, are held near constant in the long run.

596 If there is a tendency in industrial society to implicitly regulate growth in things such as
597 energy use, insights into this could be obtained from considering the $\sim 2.4\% \text{ yr}^{-1}$ long-term
598 growth rate on which industrial society appears to settle. At this point, we note that a relative
599 growth rate of $a = 2.4\% \text{ yr}^{-1}$ corresponds to a growth timescale of $a^{-1} = 42$ years. It would
600 therefore appear sensible to attempt to understand growth in the context of this timescale.

601 To explore the possible relationships between a and the timescale a^{-1} we start by assuming
602 that the optimisation of the distribution component of the RADE network, combined with the

603 increasing acquisition and end-use efficiencies to control growth (as implied by the control in
604 equation 5), point to energy efficiency being an important systemic consideration. Energy
605 efficiency improvements of any kind amount to actions taken to reduce waste and hence
606 increase energy available for specific end uses. Although end-use is notoriously difficult to
607 specify, in the highly reduced description of the global energy system offered above, this
608 end-use can be summarised simply as the work done to expand the size of industrial
609 society. As a result, we refer to the energy not used directly in this work as ‘supportive’
610 energy use, x_s . i.e. energy supporting, but not directly used, in growth. System-wide optimal
611 energy efficiency improvements imply x_s is minimised in order to liberate as much energy for
612 growth as necessary. Examples of supportive energy might be the energy expended on
613 exploring, acquiring and distributing resources, personal transport, waste heat and light, etc.
614 Examples of energy directly used for growth, x_G , would be energy used to construct, replace
615 and repair the physical components of industrial society such as buildings, ~~in addition to oil~~
616 ~~fields~~wells, pipelines, power stations, electricity grids, roads, railways etc.

617 We can express this supportive energy simply as

$$618 \quad x_s = x - x_G = (1 - \varepsilon)x \quad (8)$$

619 This definition of supportive energy may, at first, appear counter-intuitive because a
620 significant proportion of x_s (such as personal transport) may be thought of as being useful to
621 society. However, in the spatial context considered here, the components of x_s simply
622 represent expenditures of energy necessary to facilitate the useful work of actually
623 expanding the size of industrial society.

624 If industrial society does indeed attempt to minimise supportive energy use then we should
625 be able to identify a value of a that minimises x_s over a given timescale, T . Noting equation
626 (6) resolves to $x = e^{at}$, and combining within equation (8) gives

$$627 \quad X_s = a^{-1}(1 - \varepsilon)e^{aT} \quad (9)$$

628 where X_S is supportive energy accumulated over the integration timescale T . We can now
629 differentiate equation (9) with respect to a to find the value of a ~~which that~~ minimises X_S and,
630 by implication, maximises growth over this timescale. Hence,

$$631 \quad \frac{dX_S}{da} = \frac{(1-\varepsilon)Te^{aT}}{a} - \frac{(1-\varepsilon)e^{aT}}{a^2} \quad (10)$$

632 which, for $dX_S/da = 0$, has a minimum in X_S at $T = a^{-1}$. Therefore, the growth rate of such a
633 system is fundamentally linked to the timescale over which the system behaviour is
634 optimised with respect to x_S .

635 Figure 6 shows the relationship between a and X_S predicted by equation (9). The minimum
636 in X_S with respect to a can be understood in that, for any given integration timescale T , if a
637 is below its optimum then the system experiences disproportionate short-term increases in
638 x_S and hence in X_S (equation 8). However, if a is above its optimum the system experiences
639 disproportionate long-term increases in X_S because of the effects of enhanced growth
640 (equation 6).

641 ~~Having established a possible connection between the long run relative growth in global~~
642 ~~primary energy use, $a \approx 2.4\% \text{ yr}^{-1}$, and the associated timescale, $a^{-1} = 42 \text{ yr}$, the question~~
643 ~~is why remains, why does growth proceed on this timescale?~~ As pointed out above, both
644 technologies in general (Grübler et al., 1999) and large power schemes in particular (Davis
645 and Caldeira, 2010) have average lifetimes of ~ 40 years. However, as also noted above,
646 these may simply be manifestations of the need to evolve the global energy portfolio in line
647 with its growth rate in order to allow for the required rate of uptake of innovations. Therefore,
648 we look to an alternative explanation of the underlying driver for growth organised at this ~ 40
649 year timescale.

650 Thus far, we have largely avoided discussing the role of the now seven billion agents
651 involved in making the decisions that lead to the observed emergent behaviour we have
652 attempted to describe ~~above~~. We note that where observations are available, ~ 40 years is

653 the average working lifetime of people in industrial societies and that this has been a
654 relatively constant property of industrial societies (Ausbel and Grübler, 1995; Conover, 2011)
655 despite the very significant improvements in overall life expectancy in most countries. In
656 addition to the empirical observation that working lifetimes have been stable at around 40
657 years for a long time, the reason we might implicate working lifetimes as a possible factor on
658 which growth might be organised is that it is only during this timeframe that people can exert
659 influence over the decisions governing the evolution of industrial society. Prior to working, or
660 during retirement, although people are using resources, they are not directly able to
661 influence the evolution of the system. If during their working lifetimes the objective is to seek
662 out near optimal energy efficiency improvements and hence, by implication, to maximise
663 work done, then this should be sufficient to result in $a \sim T^{-1} \sim 2.4\% \text{ yr}^{-1}$.

664 Figure 6 also shows that the objective function (equation 9) is more sensitive to changes in a
665 below the optimum than above it. If this is true it would explain why periods of below
666 optimum growth are more acutely experienced by industrial societies than are periods of
667 above optimum growth periods^{vi}. Figure 6 also shows the effects of doubling the integration
668 timescale T . As T is increased the optimal growth rate falls because the effects of the long-
669 run growth on supportive energy (equation 6) weigh more than those of short-term losses
670 (equation 8). This is equivalent to an inter-generational view of sustainability in that, by
671 extending the integration interval beyond an individualistic working lifetime, growth is
672 moderated.

673 **9. Concluding remarks**

674 In this paper we offer a novel analysis of the behaviour of industrial society based on the
675 physical behaviour of distribution networks. Specifically, we have used global energy use

^{vi} In many respects this is linked to the concept of business cycle asymmetries; or what Keynes (1936) referred to as 'the phenomenon of the crisis – the fact that the substitution of a downward for an upward tendency often takes place suddenly and violently, whereas there is, as a rule, no such sharp turning-point when an upward is substituted for a downward tendency.

676 data to ~~develop the idea~~ explore our hypothesis that industrial society progressively fills
677 space as it grows and that innovations are continually used to overcome the increasing size-
678 related penalties of this growth.

679 In order for industrial society to grow, the Resource Acquisition, Distribution and End-use
680 (RADE) system must be adaptive because the optimal portfolio of resources and end-uses
681 and the appropriate networks linking the two cannot be known *a priori*. Solving this problem
682 under conditions of relatively deep uncertainty would require forms of dynamic optimisation.
683 As a result, it is not surprising that we see quite rich dynamic behaviour in the growth rate of
684 global primary energy use about its long run value of $\sim 2.4\% \text{ yr}^{-1}$ (Jarvis and Hewitt, 2014).
685 Such behaviour is clearly not planned centrally, but emerges through the free exchange of
686 information afforded by globalised market mechanisms.

687 We have identified three distinct points at which we believe the innovations necessary for
688 adaptation occur: at the point of acquisition of resources from the environment; during their
689 distribution; and during their conversion at points of end-use. Without such adaptive capacity
690 both resource availability and their associated distribution costs should limit growth.

691 Within the framework we have set out, growth in global primary energy use is fundamentally
692 controlled by the optimisation of the RADE system. We have speculated that this
693 optimisation is driven by the inherent desire of people in industrial societies to minimise
694 energy losses and hence maximise work. Since people are only able to significantly
695 influence such decisions during their working lifetimes it may not be surprising that the
696 growth in industrial society appears to be regulated on this timescale.

697 We acknowledge there are many contentious points in our discussion that challenge ~~closely~~
698 ~~held~~ conventional views about how industrial society behaves. If it could be stated with
699 confidence that the behaviour of industrial society is largely known, then our attempts to offer
700 an alternative perspective could be considered foolish. However, industrial society must rank
701 as one of the most complex objects in the ~~known~~ universe and our understanding of its

702 behaviour ~~has been shrouded in uncertainty~~remains poor, to say the least. ~~Exploiting~~
703 ~~Utilising long-run global energy use data~~theoretical insights from other fields in order to
704 explore this behaviour appears a ~~sensible-reasonable~~ strategy. The same can be said for
705 ~~exploiting long run global energy use data -as~~ given that changes in energy use are
706 ~~obviously coupled with the evolution of global industrial society~~industrial society. ~~energy~~
707 ~~use may be much less uncertain than more established economic measures than more~~
708 ~~established metrics, such as GDP.~~ However, significant further work is required to
709 substantiate or refute our arguments. This is ongoing.

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808

809 **Figure legends**

810 **Figure 1. a.** The relationship between global primary energy use, x , and global final energy,
811 x^* . Two definitions of final energy are shown; (o) are the IEA estimates, (●) are the IEA
812 estimates adjusted for energy used for transport, agriculture, forestry, mining and quarrying.
813 **b.** The relationship between global primary energy use, x , and primary to final network
814 efficiency, defined as the ratio x^*/x (●). Also shown are the estimated variations in end-use
815 efficiency assuming a total system efficiency 10 percent (+). The IEA definition of primary to
816 final energy efficiencies (o) are also shown for reference. **c.** The relationship between global
817 primary energy use, x , and global anthropogenic CO₂ emissions, y , for the data shown in
818 Figure 1. **d.** The relationship between global primary energy use, x , and the carbon intensity
819 of global primary energy, x/y . The bands for all plots represent 5th to 95th uncertainty ranges
820 from the linear regressions. See text for all data sources and compilation.

821 **Figure 2.** The relationship between country specific primary energy use, x_i , and final energy
822 use, x_i^* for the period 1971 – 2010. Individual countries are marked with different colours, N
823 = 140. The data for all countries for 2010 are marked separately (o). All country specific
824 energy data are normalised using the surface area of the country. The surface area is an
825 imperfect proxy for the space occupied by each country if the global system is filling a three
826 dimensional volume. In the absence of data, we assume that the magnitude of the vertical
827 dimension is constant across all 140 countries. Note that the higher per unit area energy
828 consumers have per unit area energy flows that are a significant proportion of the solar
829 constant. The inset figure shows both the exponential scaling coefficient estimated from the
830 annual relationship between x_i and x_i^* (values near 1) along with the primary to final energy
831 efficiency x_i^*/x_i plotted for each year 1970 to 2010. The bands represent 5th to 95th
832 uncertainty range for the estimates. See text for data sources and compilation.

833 **Figure 3. i.** Annual global primary energy use [11,12,13] with regression line given by $\ln x$
834 $= a(t - t_1)$; $a = 0.0238 \pm 0.0008 \text{ yr}^{-1}$; $t_1 = 1775 \pm 3.5 \text{ CE}$. **ii.** Annual global anthropogenic CO₂
835 emissions [15, 16, 17] with regression line given by $\ln y = b(t - t_1)$; $b = 0.0179 \pm 0.0006 \text{ yr}^{-1}$; t_1

836 = 1883 ± 1.7 AD. **iii.** Carbon intensity of global primary energy determined by the ratio y/x .

837 See text for data sources and compilation.

838 **Figure 4.** A schematic 1D representation of the global RADE system. Here units of primary
839 energy, x , are linked to those of final energy, x^* , via a distribution network. The black
840 outlined system represents the initial stage of the systems evolution. The red outlined
841 system represents the subsequent addition of units of final energy use and hence primary
842 energy use and hence the expansion of the network linking the two.

843 **Figure 5.** The system diagram representation of the endogenous growth model set out in
844 equations (1 to 5). Numbers in boxes denote which equations apply. s in the ‘construction’
845 transfer function is the derivative operator, d/dt .

846 **Figure 6.** The relationship between the relative growth rate on global primary energy, a , and
847 the total energy not directly used in growth, X_s . Two scenarios are presented, one with an
848 integration timescale of $T = 42$ years (—) and one with an integration timescale of $T = 84$
849 years (—).

850




Figure 1.




Figure 2.




Figure 3.




Figure 4.




Figure 5.




Figure 6.